(This if the first of two parts of a paper analysing the balance of power in Zimbabwe two years after the inception of the Inclusive Government in 2009)

A FEW years ago, I carried out an analysis of the balance of power in Zimbabwean politics. A universally accepted source of political power in a democratic society is the people. The proposition is that society organises itself so that it confers power to some among their number to perform the duties of government.

In return for conceding that power, the rest of society expects protection, stability and an environment in which they can maximise their potential. Those who earn the power to govern therefore carry certain responsibilities to society.  They are in a position of trust, entrusted as they are with the power of government. It is what Locke referred to as the “social contract” – an arrangement between the governors and the governed. 

In modern democratic politics such a contract is negotiated through elections, which negotiations are renewed after a set period.  Through the election process, society can assess the performance of the governors and decide whether or not to give them power to continue in office. This means power can be conferred through an election or removed and transferred from one set of governors to another depending on their ability to convince society that they are the best to deliver on its aspirations.

Having observed Zimbabwean politics for some time, it was apparent that elections were not serving this purpose. There were critical barriers to the effectiveness of the election as a mechanism through which society could negotiate its ‘social contract’ with its governors. It occurred to me that somewhere along the line something had happened to affect this ‘contract’ so that the election process had become ineffective.

The efficacy of the people as a source of power had therefore been weakened and subordinated to other sources. It prompted me to search for other sources of power. Many questions, including the following, called for consideration:

What is it that enables governors to retain power to govern, the absence of power from the people notwithstanding? Where else do they draw their power from, if not from the people through an election process? Importantly, what obstacles must power from the people negotiate to become an effective source of power?

This is by no means a redundant exercise. It is important because it gives some perspective on the challenges in the way of achieving a democratic society in which it can be said that power truly derives from the people. Identifying the sources of power demonstrates the impediments to realising power normally derived from the people. Without a better understanding of these sources of power, the election process will likely remain an exercise in futility.

There is only one exception, which is that power drawn from the people could be achieved otherwise than through the election process, as we have recently seen in Tunisia and the on-going unrest in Egypt, but even this has to be seen within the broader context of the sources of power that we discuss here and the attendant risks.  

In a previous work, I adapted to the domestic context Susan Strange’s model of ‘structural power’ in the international political economy.  Strange referred to two kinds of power namely, relational power and structural power, the first referring to the power to influence others in their conduct and the second signifying the power to shape and determine how things are done within a given context.

Those who hold structural power determine the institutional structures, rules, etc according to and within which others operate. In short, they are agenda-setter and controllers of ways in which things are done. Four sources from which structural power is drawn were identified: Production, Finance, Security and Knowledge.

After analysing the political players in Zimbabwe, the conclusion was that Zanu PF’s strength lay in the fact that compared to other political players, it was better placed to draw power deriving from each of these key sources. The fact that it possessed an enormous amount of structural power meant that it was able to determine the way things were done – including more critically, the way elections are held and generally the rules within which all others must operate.

So for example, because it possesses high levels of power drawn from the security structure, it could decide, if it so wished to ignore the results of the election. That would be too blatant so the next best option was it could manage the election process to suit its needs and expectations. At the time I was sceptical about the outcome of the 2008 elections principally because I doubted the effectiveness of the election process conferring power in the face of these other sources of power. 

As it happened, the 2008 elections were a failure in so far as allowing the people to confer power on their choice of the governors was concerned. What we saw in 2008 was confirmation of the power drawn from other sources overriding power otherwise drawn from the people through an election process. The result was the compromise encapsulated in the Global Political Agreement of September 2009 and the unity government that commenced operations in February 2009.

Given my scepticism over the election, the limits of power from the people otherwise than through the election and the cul-de-sac that the country had reached, I joined the ranks of those who initially backed the coalition government. It was not what the people wanted but it was the least they could have under the circumstances. My own view was that it was a window of opportunity to affect the balance of power by the erstwhile opposition but only if they were able to gain some space to draw power from the identified sources: production, security, knowledge and finance structures. Two years after the commencement of the unity government, it is pertinent to assess the extent to which power dynamics have changed, if at all.

The argument here is that power is vested in those who control the means of production. This of course has to be a viable production system. Perhaps the most contested means of production from which power is drawn is the land. It has been the case for many years but none more so that in the last decade when the Zanu PF government instigated the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) during which land was forcibly taken away from the majority of the white commercial farmers had occupied the country’s most productive land since the colonial times. Although the success or failure of the land reform programme remains a point of debate, it is evident from the food deficit that the country has faced in the last decade (from a previous position of food surplus in most years since independence)  is indicative of the general malaise in the food production structures.

Taking land from the white farmers was justified as redressing colonial wrongs, but against the background of our model, one cannot avoid the observation that white farmers and their productive business were a key part of the production structure. To the extent that this production structure provided a source of power, contests over the land question can also be seen as contests between political players over access to this power.

White farmers were seen to be resisting Zanu PF’s land reforms and aligning themselves to the MDC, the new political force challenging Zanu PF’s power. To the extent that the white farmers were seen as supporting the MDC, it is arguable that Zanu PF saw this as diminishing hold that they had on power drawn from the production structure. The MDC was perceived to be drawing financial support from the white farmers and to that extent, drawing power from the production structure. Therefore, to the extent that the white farmers represented a critical part of the production structure, the forced evictions from the land can be seen as a tool to weaken the opposition. 

The effect of price controls, whilst designed to cushion the general public against effects of hyperinflation, were also a means of controlling the power vested in the economic players that derived from their role as producers or agents of service and goods’ provision. Leaving prices to market forces would have meant exposing the public to inevitable price hikes and therefore increasing the levels of discontent against the government which the public inevitably holds responsible.

Similarly, in recent years there has been much debate around the indigenisation of commercial business in Zimbabwe. Much of the debate has centred on the requirement that 51% of companies ought to be owned by an indigenous Zimbabwean, as defined in the relevant law. This follows a similar pattern to the land reforms where again the indigenisation agenda was the dominant justification. In effect, this is an effort to gain greater control of the means of production, from which power is derived.

The biggest source of power from this structure in more recent years however, has been in mining and mineral wealth in particular the recent diamond finds in the Marange alluvial diamond fields.  Zanu PF has again emerged as the foremost winner in the race for the extraction and trade of diamonds muscling out commercial players such as Africa Consolidated Resources Ltd that had laid prior claim to the fields.

The MDC and others do not seem to have any clue as to what exactly is happening in Marange and its diamonds. The international debate over the status of the Marange diamonds, i.e. whether or not they are ‘Blood Diamonds’ whose trade must not be sanctioned under the Kimberly Process is testimony to attempts to neutralise the power otherwise drawn by Zanu PF from the production and trade of diamonds. No doubt, diamonds have played an influential role in changing the power dynamics by providing to Zanu PF the financial resources that had dwindled over the years.

The problem however, is that despite gaining greater control of the means of production, apart from the diamond production, has yielded little power to Zanu PF simply because there is very limited production for example in agriculture and industry. Nevertheless, the fact that no one else among the political players has control of the means of production in the way that Zanu PF does means that relatively speaking, by comparison, they draw less power from this source.

The proposition in regard to knowledge is that power vests in those who control knowledge within a given society - knowledge being broadly defined to include any information – media, academic, research material etc. The most relevant for present purposes is information gathered, produced and disseminated by the media but it is worth noting that control over knowledge is also evident in academic and research bodies that include universities, colleges, curricula and examination bodies. Control can be seen not only in what is produced to the public but through strategic appointments with a view to ensuring control of what those bodies produce, teach and disseminate to the wider public.

Most academics often call for protection under the banner of “academic freedom”, essentially representing the freedom that members of the academy should have in pursuing their work. Much of the post-independence debate over academic freedom in the face of encroachments by the state began seriously in the early 1990s with the significant amendments to the law providing for the University of Zimbabwe. The infamous University of Zimbabwe (Amendment) Act, 1990 was seen as marking significant erosion of academic freedom – a clear sign then of attempts to control the knowledge structure. Complaints that history taught in Zimbabwean schools takes a bias towards the Zanu PF world view are indicative of the challenge against Zanu PF’s dominance  over the knowledge-generating institutions enabling it to determine what and how can be taught in the wider academy.

As stated already, the crucial form of knowledge at the centre of contestation is information generated by and through media. Learning from the colonial government, Zanu PF has kept tight control over both the print and broadcast media since independence. The Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) is probably the most infamous piece of legislation enacted to control the media. It signifies the intention to control the ‘who, why and how’ questions on the production of information for the public dissemination.

By controlling the media, one is able to control what people get, how they get it, the time they get it and the extent to which the information reaches them. It has often been the case that those outside Zimbabwe have greater access to information about what is happening in different parts country largely because for locals those in control of the state media which had a near monopoly on the daily production of information, have been able to control and censor information transmitted internally. The closure of the Daily News and its subsequent demise in 2003 was indicative of the determination to control power emanating from the knowledge structure.  

The international media were for years banned precisely because Zanu PF was unimpressed by what it felt to be biased coverage towards the opposition or at the very least, against its interests.

However, even before the GNU in 2009, Zanu PF has struggled to retain undiluted power from this structure mainly due to the influence of new technology. The internet, electronic mail and in more recent years the proliferation of users of social networking forums such as Facebook, Twitter, etc has reduced the information barriers that previously existed. Zimbabweans across the world can share information produced in various media in an instant.

Current events in the North African region where demonstrations in Egypt and Tunisia have been organised through and around social networking forums such as Facebook illustrate the impact of technology in the political arena. A number of Zimbabwean politicians have also embraced social media in order to communicate with the wider public but indications are that this reach is limited to those based abroad or the local public that has access to new technology. To those who have access to such media, no amount of legislative control can affect their ability to communicate, share information in the forms and ways they want.

The September 2008 GPA contained undertakings to reform the media. During the life of the unity government a few changes have emerged including more fundamentally a more inclusive process of appointing members of the Zimbabwe Media Commission, a constitutional body which regulates the media. Although the composition dilutes the formerly exclusive influence of Zanu PF, its remit does not seem to extend to the electronic media. Therefore, although some private newspapers have been licensed and a new daily (Newsday) has since come into the market, practical challenges have led to slow growth in the private media industry. In addition, barriers to the international media have been lifted.

The MDC has tried to counter this and draw some power from the knowledge structure through the Prime Ministers newsletter but it is competing against long standing institutions and brands that still dominate media space.  The growth of so-called ‘pirate radio stations’ such as Studio 7 (broadcast though the Voice of America), SW Radio Africa from London, Voice of the People from South Africa and others demonstrates attempts at diluting Zanu PF’s power drawn from the knowledge structure.

These are efforts targeted towards disseminating other information to the public, beyond the information broadcast through the state radio and television. The public has been resisting the state media dominance by exploiting new technology to access international broadcast services from South Africa and beyond.  All but a few homes that do not have official satellite transmission, have little boxes, called ‘Wiztechs’ or similar that enable them to access regional and international media. This is citizen participation in diluting power drawn from the knowledge structure.

The proliferation of news websites has been a greater source of information and debate on Zimbabwean politics but again like all internet-based media and social networking forums, the reach is limited to those who have access to such technology. This means the greater majority of the Zimbabwean public residing in the rural areas have very limited independent sources of information besides the electronic media which is still predominantly controlled by Zanu PF. State media still dominates media space and remains inclined towards Zanu PF.