Re-cap: In the first part of this article, I proposed an analysis of the balance of power in Zimbabwe under the four structures from which power is drawn outside the election process, namely: Production, Knowledge (Information), Finance and Security structures.

I argued that these structures are sources of structural power which enables the holder to set the agenda and determine how things are done within a specific polity. Consequently, any political party that is able to draw the most power from these sources has greater leverage over others and even undermines power normally drawn from the people through an election.

In the first part, I considered power drawn from the Production and Knowledge structures and concluded that Zanu PF still draws a lion’s share of power from these structures particularly given control over diamond production and the dominance of state print and broadcast media.

In this second part, I analyse power drawn from the Finance and Security structures. I also consider the potential of power drawn from the people outside the normal election process.

In this structure power derives from the ability to control sources, access and distribution of finance. In this case, the sources of finance include banks and other financial institutions but also donors and other benefactors both internal and external. As far back as the 1980s, Zanu PF recognised the importance of creating viable sources of financing its activities as a political party hence its investment in various corporate entities over the years.

Unbeknown to most people, Zanu PF has always been a significant player in corporate institutions. It’s largesse from these investments may have dwindled over the years but access to diamonds (where finance links with control of the production structure) means that it has far better access to internal resources than any other political entity. The banking sector is yet to sufficiently recover from the hyperinflationary years so its role as a source of credit remains limited.

In a recent article, Herald columnist Nathaniel Manheru alluded to fears that the Finance Ministry, headed by MDC-T Minister Tendai Biti, was using the national budget to try to control certain parts of government including the central bank and the judiciary. The Ministry of Defence and defence chiefs have also complained that they are being reduced to penury by reason of what they consider to be inadequate budgetary allocations by the finance ministry.

All these are signs of tussles over finance and whether or not there is a conscious effort on the part of the MDC, through this ministry to exercise control remains a matter for debate but it is telling that there is acrimony over the finance structure. Whether Zanu PF is actually feeling the loss of power formerly drawn from control of the finance ministry or these are just crocodile tears the mere fact that questions have been raised is indicative of the critical significance of power sourced from finance.

In the past, the importance of the finance structure as a source of power was demonstrated more clearly by the activities of the central bank (Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe) during the hyperinflationary period when it and its governor became probably the most powerful institution outside the office of the President and the military ranks. As the national coffers dwindled, the central bank encroached into fiscal activities taking on a quasi-fiscal role that made it the most central player in the economy.

Taking on a role normally played by commercial banks, the central bank created credit facilities which were extended to key political players under the umbrella of supporting the land reform programme and sustaining vital industries. It printed money to cover shortfalls and extend yet more credit. It became a key source of finance and opponents argue that much of it was in support of the then ruling party, Zanu PF.

Consequently, the battles over control of the finance ministry during the GPA negotiations and the subsequent public fights between the then new Finance Minister, Tendai Biti and Governor Gideon Gono reflected a much larger tussle for control of power deriving from the finance structure. In the end Governor Gono has retained his position at the central bank, reflecting Zanu PF’s desire to retain some control over the finance structure. Yet the whittling down of the governor’s powers through legislation also demonstrate the MDC-T’s success in making in-roads into this finance structure.

Finance Minister Tendai Biti has performed a widely acclaimed role in helping stabilise the economy since he took over in February 2009. Yet despite his valiant efforts, even he acknowledges that sources of finance are severely limited especially with support from external funders and donors being channelled through non-governmental organisations. The very fact that the donors have been reluctant to extend direct support to government and have instead chosen to do so through NGOs is testament to the sensitivities over the role of finance as a source of power.

It is in this context that Zanu PF also raises the issue of sanctions, arguing that lines of credit and other channels of support have been blocked, making it difficult to finance government activities. Giving finance to the NGOs as opposed to government creates a source of power that challenges the traditional government structure and role. It means the NGO sector is able to draw greater power from the finance structure than the government is able to. This also explains the continuing battles between government and the civil society sector since the latter has become a centre of power by virtue of its access to finance.

On the other hand, it is fair to say that former opposition parties and their NGO allies have been heavily reliant on support from the donor community. Therefore, to the extent that the donor community may be developing any doubts as to their ability to carry out fundamental reform or indeed the dwindling resources from their own countries that fund the pot from which the donor community draw their funding, any decrease in support would have the effect of weakening the power that these parties have in this respect.

Put another way, if donor support to the opposition were to decrease, they would suffer terribly because they do not seem to have any other independent means of support whereas Zanu PF has at its disposal control of the production structure – which includes mining and diamonds which provide a significant source of finance.

Regrettably, official political party financing by the state under the laws governing such funding is of limited effect. This means all political parties will, as has been the case before continue to live on handouts from external donors. This is not a good state of affairs because as the old adage goes, there is no free lunch in this world. Donors invariably attach conditions to their financial support and ultimately, they hold considerable power in internal politics even though it is not always apparent.

It is the tragedy of African politics that almost all parties rely on external forms of financial support and these benefactors generally exercise control over politicians that is far beyond what the voting public can ever exert on them.

As elections draw closer, finance will be a critical factor. The party that wields greater financial power will have some leverage over others. Even if having great financial power does not translate into more votes, as I have argued above, elections themselves are limited unless there is a fundamental shift in the power drawn from these various structures, the last of which is perhaps the most critical and it is important that we turn to it at this stage.

This structure is probably the most significant source of power in the present political context. In simple terms, this represents the power to provide or withdraw security to the public.  One of the major justifications of government is that men and women who wish to live in a stable society organise themselves and confer power on those who will govern them and in return can expect security and protection. In any given state the role of security is given to the uniformed forces (the military, the police and prison services and intelligence).

The military defend the people in times of war, the police ensure law and order are preserved, carrying out investigations when need arises and presenting matters to prosecution authorities whilst the prison services handle the punishment and rehabilitation of offenders. The intelligence services add to this structure to protect the interests of the state. The security structure is the muscle of the state and whoever is in control of this structure has enormous levels of power.

The ideal position is that the security forces are independent of the political arms of the state. They serve the state and not individual political parties so that whenever there is a change of government the security forces allegiance to the institution of government must not waver. Those occupying the security structure have the advantage of arms which civilians are otherwise prohibited from carrying unless they are licensed to do so. It means that should they wish to venture into the political arena, they would be at a serious advantage to push through their will.

In such a scenario the covenant between the people and the state would have been broken for the people only give up their power in return for protection. If those occupying the security structure choose to ignore the will of the public then the government would no longer be said to be fit for purpose. This is why in situations when the military carries out a coup against a civilian government justification for the takeover is often that their action is in the public interest. This is usually based on the claimed desire to rid a country of corrupt political leaders and any takeover is often accompanied by an undertaking that the country would be returned to civilian rule ‘as soon as possible’. They therefore present themselves as ‘cleansing agents’ of the state.

Coups are likely to happen where there is a disjuncture between the interests of those occupying the security structures and the interests of political leaders. Therefore understanding the need to keep the security people onside, political leaders usually try by all means to align their interests so that there is less risk of disharmony. Political leaders who have the backing of the security people have enormous power compared to their counterparts who lack that support.

Older readers of history will recall the infamous declaration at the advent of the colonial period, when asked about their prospects in African, the colonial agent remarked: “We have the Maxim gun and they have not”. This was to simply confirm that those who hold the gun have power.

More recently, President Mugabe was quoted as having said before the 2008 election that the ballot box would never beat the bullet. At the time and a few years before heads of the country’s security forces had declared that they would not salute as President anyone who had not participated in the war of independence in the 1970s, a less than subtle declaration that in the contest between Mugabe and Tsvangirai they would back Mugabe on the basis of his liberation war credentials.

It is plain that of the main political parties in Zimbabwe, it is Zanu PF that draws the bulk if not all of the power sourced from the security structure. There have been suggestions that even if Zanu PF were defeated in an election, the likelihood of change in the absence of the consent of those in the security structure, the result would be no more than a Pyrrhic victory for the opponents.

Recognising this obvious position, there were attempts under the GPA by the MDC to negotiate some paths that would enable them to draw some power from the security structure or at least to neutralise Zanu PF’s dominance in this respect. Legislation towards the creation of a new National Security Council where the Prime Minister would sit alongside the Generals in deliberating and deciding matters of national security was one such measure. The other was taking ministerial control of the Home Affairs portfolio under which the police falls. The MDC failed to get this exclusive power and instead had to settle for co-sharing with Zanu PF. Zanu PF’s reluctance to let go of this ministry and the MDC’s insistence on having some control demonstrated the intense battle over control of power drawn from the security structure.

Two years down the road, there is little evidence that anything has changed. The Prime Minister has yet to gain a foothold in the National Security Council as it seems to be business as usual via the old Joint Operations Command that it was meant to replace. Having a minister in the Home Affairs ministry does not appear to have caused much change in the way the police operates.

It must be added here too, that the Attorney General’s Office, which works hand in hand with the police still operates in the usual mode, which is hardly surprising given that the incumbent declared his support for Zanu PF. Despite being in government for two years the MDC still complains about issues such as selective application of the law and cases that its supporters have raised in the past have hardly received any attention from the investigating and prosecuting authorities.

To fully appreciate the reasons for Zanu PF’s leverage over the security structure, I have previously written about the enduring roots of links between the civilian politicians and the military within Zanu PF dating back to the liberation struggle. There was never a complete separation between civilian politicians and military leaders when you analyse the leadership structures such as Dare ReChimurenga (the War Council).

The famous Mgagao Declaration which spelt the end of Ndabaningi Sithole’s reign in ZANU and the rise of Robert Mugabe as its leader is a clear example of how the military was always heavily involved in the selection of political leaders. I maintain that this pattern has hardly changed over the years. It is a culture that endures and probably goes a long way to explain why the security structure is heavily wedded to the political structure of leadership.

The above analysis of sources of power proceeded on the argument that power emanating from the people through the agency of elections has generally failed on account of the overbearing influence of the power emanating from other sources discussed in particular the security structure. I pointed out however, that the election is only one of the agencies through which power generated from the people can be a critical force in the balance of power within a given context.

Events of recent weeks in Tunisia and Egypt, which follow precedents in other countries like Ukraine a few years ago, demonstrate that power emanating from the people (which we may conveniently refer to as ‘people power’) can, in permitting environments, be an immense and effective influence. Politics in Tunisia has shifted dramatically in the work of the popular demonstrations that led to the unceremonious departure of the President and the subsequent dissolution of government. The shock-waves of this phenomenal event are now being felt in Egypt.

It is not clear whether the effects of these events will be felt beyond the Arab world but it may also be presumptuous to think that they will. Context matters – the historical and other environmental factors within which these events are happening have to be considered and may differ fundamentally from circumstances in the rest of the African region. It does not entail that what has happened and is happening there will be replicated in other countries albeit facing similar problems.

However, the events do show that power emanating from the people cannot be underestimated and ultimately it is this that may have the final say in calibrating the balance of power where all other sources remain impossible to confer power. In this vein, the words of Justice Learned Hand, the American jurist seem apt. He wrote in his book, The Spirit of Liberty: “Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no constitution, no law, no court can save it; no constitution, no law, no court can even do much to help it”

Perhaps then, it might be said that, having failed in the courts, elections and elsewhere, the people of Tunisia have demonstrated what the spirit of liberty can achieve to alter the balance of power.

This article has analysed the balance of power in Zimbabwean politics two years after the inception of the unity government. This has been done through an analysis of four key sources of power namely security, production, finance and knowledge. I have acknowledged that whilst an election is the generally accepted and most desirable method of deciding political power, experience has demonstrated that elections in Zimbabwe and therefore the popular will plays a subordinate role to and is significantly affected by these other  sources of power.

The question at stake is, if the election has so far failed to significantly alter the balance of power, what else determines the distribution of power? By adapting Strange’s model of structural power in international relations, I have sought to identify four sources of power and analyse the kind of power that is drawn from them and who among the political players in Zimbabwe draws the most power from those structures. Until such time that there is a fundamental change in the way the respective players draw power from these sources, changing power relations remains work in progress.

-          Within the Zimbabwean context, the kind of power that is drawn from the production structure has been diluted by poor productivity due to inefficient use of the means of production. However, but the diamond finds of Marange have been a significant boost to the power emanating from production and that this is principally in Zanu PF’s hands augments the otherwise diminished power.

-          Second, power drawn from the knowledge structure has been slightly diluted by the influence of new technology which enables people to access more sources of information. The slight changes to the regulatory landscape have also played a limited part but Zanu PF’s control of the electronic media means it retains the lion’s share of this type of power.

-          Although the role of the central bank has been much diminished in the last two years, diamond finds provide a key source of finance that would otherwise be very scarce. The MDC’s control of the finance ministry has provoked panic reaction in Zanu PF especially in recent weeks where complaints regarding deliberate underfunding of key sectors such as the central bank, the judiciary and the security forces have been raised. A counter-balancing factor here is that the MDC and civil society allies retain greater access to donor funding but as argued above, this comes at a significant cost to their own institutional independence.

-          Fourth, it is clear that power drawn from the security structure is still very much in Zanu PF’s domain. This is the critical structure of power without which transfer of power through elections is likely to remain a distant illusion.

-          Finally, whilst events in North Africa suggest once again that the people themselves present the greatest source of power there is nothing to suggest that events like that can be replicated elsewhere. Much depends on organisation but also on the power drawn from other structures analysed in this paper.

Two years after the inception of the GNU, not a great deal has changed to suggest that an election can be a viable agency for determination of power distribution. Many factors have conspired to make it difficult to effect the incremental changes that would have affected the balance of power in which Zanu PF retains greater leverage in drawing power from the various key sources, chief of which is the security structure.