In the second of a two part series, Southern Africa defence analyst Paul Sorenson concludes that rather than overseeing an evolution toward democracy, Tsvangirai and his party may be elongating Zanu-PF’s disastrous rule – and losing touch with a young and impatient generation that has until now been its core constituency.

THESE conclusions are reinforced by the views of respondents on the implications of the political deadlock that occurred following the elections of 2008.

Asked about the possibility of a repeat after the next elections, most expressed a strong preference for mass violence.

It was felt that Zimbabweans should: “Strategise well before it happens, mobilise the people and resources and fight back … demonstrate, fighting together as one. The main problem with Zimbabweans (is that) they’re civilized – sometimes maximum force is needed.

“Speak with one voice and do the unthinkable, rioting and demonstrations around the country. Because there will be no further solution for (the generals) to understand that they are no longer wanted … call for a massive strike so as to raise the eyebrows of the international community.

“Or unite and fight for our rights. Revisit the Defence Act and be united and remove the generals violently if any … will not leave the system. (React by) killing those generals … and do the same to their relatives and families.

To the extent that divisions within the security forces are thought to have any relevance to the possibility of a popular uprising, observers often point to widespread disenchantment and suggest that a large proportion of servicemen would be content to take a passive role.

It is less often suggested that the junior strata of the service – or even ex-servicemen – might take an active, aggressive and potentially leading part in any popular challenge to the established order.

The African nationalist struggle against colonialism not only created enduring links between those who went on to become political leaders in different countries, it forged strong international relations between people (and institutions) directly involved in the physical conflict with white-ruled states. Nowadays, these bonds are regularly reinforced through official regional and bilateral exchanges and meetings, and through unofficial social contact.

But after thirty years of Zimbabwean independence, how close is the ideology of senior regional security officials to Mugabe’s men? And what are their specific views on the future of Zimbabwe’s security forces?

When asked about the validity of Zanu- PF’s conspiracist outlook – and its deeply held belief that MDC is essentially a tool of the West – interviewees were sharply divided.

The deputy commander of one of the region’s national armies ridiculed the idea as ‘rubbish’ and said it was ‘bound to come from a retrogressive clique which has run out of excuses to cling to power’.

Likewise, a former deputy director-general of intelligence remarked that the claim was ‘nonsense’ and that Zanu-PF ‘would grope at any excuse to maintain and remain in power’.

Regional Perspectives

A serving director-general of a neighbouring intelligence service noted that the opposition ‘enjoys a lot of support and sympathy from the Zimbabweans of Western descent internally, and directly from the West’, but added that ‘mobilisation for change is by educated locals supported and to some extent funded by “whites” … who are active members of the opposition’.

However, others insisted that Zanu-PF was merely stating the obvious: But of course (MDC is a party of the West]) All you need to do is look at how many whites are in the opposition as against those in the ruling party.

The same person – a national police commissioner – commented that the refusal of Zimbabwean service chiefs to accept a non-liberation president was to be expected, though he pointed not to ideology but to a utilitarian rationale: “Their resistance is understandable because Mugabe has taken very good care of his senior defence and security chiefs by empowering them with businesses. (Our country) and Africa at large should emulate Mugabe if they want to consolidate their reign.”

These sentiments were echoed by an army commander: “The problems in Zimbabwe revolve around how well the military top brass have been looked after by their Commander-in-Chief. It is … scratch my back and I’ll scratch yours.

“The opposition can scream all it can but nothing will happen as long as Mugabe looks after his own well.”

Another explained that the demand for a liberation figure as head of state was ‘common’ in ‘armed forces across Africa … because of senior defence and security officials’ fear of being retired once the presidency changes hands’, yet he asserted that ‘29 years after independence is rather too late to expect a freedom fighter to contest the presidency’.

Those critical of Zanu-PF’s racial stereotypes and anti-imperialist rhetoric developed this theme further.

The director-general of intelligence said that dogmatic calls for a liberation president: could hold water only in the first two terms of a post-independence administration for understandable reasons that the freedom fighters who ultimately emerge as liberation heroes at independence should naturally be expected to constitute government including the Presidency.

To insist (that) a President should be a former freedom fighter thirty years down the line is being static … If at independence the average age for the freedom fighters turned liberators was say 40 years old, going by this condition, only those in their 70s would be eligible to contest the Presidency! It’s simply unworkable.

He also averred that nationalists were usually ‘denied the opportunity to advance their education as they were … always on the run internally or in exile’.

It follows that the first post-independence politicians ‘are of humble academic credentials’ and, though ‘Mugabe is a rare exception’, it is ‘suicidal’ in the modern world to ‘allow semi-literates to occupy the Presidency’ given the need for heads of state to engage counterparts internationally.

In terms of the future, regional security officials were (like the ex-servicemen) asked how a replay of Zimbabwe’s political crisis of 2008 could be averted or navigated.

The air force deputy felt that the best preventative measure was for the opposition to ‘exert constant pressure’ on the government to ‘strictly observe retirement age for security personnel long before elections’.

The intelligence chief shared this view, feeling that Zimbabweans needed to: Depoliticise the armed forces by strictly adhering to the statutory retirement age.

This in turn would gradually usher into the command structure younger, energetic and educated officers who understand global political trends and respect human rights and do not constantly remind their juniors how the country owes them for the immense suffering they endured in the liberation struggle.

A crop of young educated officers appreciate and interpret democracy better.

A command that belongs to the old school operates in constant fear of being replaced and displaced by any political leadership that may emerge as a result of a transparent democratic process. So they will perpetuate a dictatorship at all cost.

The retired deputy director-general of intelligence differed somewhat, believing that incentives are required.

Resistance within security forces is because the top brass are former freedom fighters who are threatened with a bleak future outside active service.

The answer lies in ensuring an attractive retirement package for command staff that would lure them into retirement thereby paving way for younger blood who would embrace democracy.

Another opined that: “neither laws, conventions nor inducements would suffice as another ‘stalemate can only be resolved by the UN on condition that the sitting government is receptive to foreign intervention, which in the case of Zimbabwe is unlikely”.

On the other hand – and reflecting his very different ideology – the police commissioner did not see the problem as particularly complex: Zanu-PF should ‘campaign hard or rig convincingly so that the margins do not call for a unity government’.

In a situation where measures to prevent a post-election paralysis fail, one security official suggested the opposition should ‘negotiate but never join hands in a unity government which allows crime to go unpunished’.

Others were more radical, offering solutions remarkably similar to those of lower-ranking Zimbabwean servicemen.

The deputy air commander thought Zimbabweans should “incite mutiny if opposition is strong in (the) defence and security forces”, while the intelligence director general said that: “In the case of resistance (by security chiefs), international political pressure is not a dependable option as has been demonstrated.

“Civil disobedience is the best option though depending on the level of the sitting administration’s brutality, this may come at great cost to the populace in terms of loss of life and human rights abuses”.

Reflections

The limited scope of the regional survey means that any conclusions must be tentative.

At the same time, it is apposite to note the marked differences in the philosophies of respondents – especially the apparent lack of a middle ground between advocates of liberal democracy and proponents of a more traditional liberation-style authoritarianism.

Ostensibly, background does not seem to have played a strong part: in fact, the contrasts in outlook are all the more striking in view of the solid liberation credentials of all the individuals and/or institutions from which they came.

Equally, generational factors are not palpable, as the age range is relatively narrow.

Instead, it is possible that many senior security officials in regional countries have responded in contrary ways to the spread of multi-party politics in Africa over the last twenty years.

Plainly, a simple dichotomy does not exist, but the notion of divergent trends is worth further study and points to levels of complexity in regional affairs that are not accounted for by popular labels.

Such trends, if real, may also presage increasing conflict within the civil-military elite of some regional countries.

As far as Zimbabwe is concerned, it is clear that Zanu-PF does not invoke virtually unanimous support in the region; the concept of undisputed backing for Mugabe minus Botswana is a caricature.

Nevertheless, there is no consensus on what should be done to move Zimbabwe toward stability or to normalise interaction between the community and the security services.

Neither is there any suggestion that regional countries should become deeply involved in the crisis.

The region has little desire to grapple with the crux of the problem – the disabling effect wrought by the collision between Zanu-PF’s physical dominance and its political illegitimacy.

Even those well-disposed to the opposition and partial to revolutionary solutions repeat the familiar mantra: this is a Zimbabwean problem that must be settled by Zimbabweans.

Placed alongside the Western approach – that Zimbabwe is a regional catastrophe requiring regional intervention – it appears probable that internal dynamics will be the key determinants of the country’s future.

To the extent that this proves true, there can be no question that the role of the security services will be a vital part of the equation.

The testimony of ex-servicemen shows conclusively that Zanu-PF is more than a one-man band.

The death or removal of Mugabe will not, in itself, resolve the Zimbabwean imbroglio.

The country’s military and political veterans are too ideologically and materially committed to the status quo to step aside without a fight – a fight they could take to each other, to MDC supporters, or to both.

Should they manage to suppress internal divisions – an open question, but one that is incentivised by an angry populace and an equally agitated junior corps – there is no indication that they will permit genuine change.

Neither will the ageing process provide an early salvation.

Unlike Zanu’s politicians, many war veterans were in their early twenties or younger at independence. This means they can continue their co-ordinating role for many years to come.

Certainly, this is the way ex-servicemen – and sympathetic regional officials – view the situation.

It is for this reason that they advocate mass mobilisation as a solution.

If they read Zanu-PF and its war veterans correctly, the ‘inclusive’ government is a chimera: it will exist only as long as it fails to deliver real transformation.

This is a hard reality with which MDC has failed to come to terms.

To be sure, its willingness to enter government with Zanu-PF and persist in spite of the abortion of the reform agenda appears to be a deliberate attempt to ignore the unpalatable reality.

Rather than overseeing an evolution toward democracy, Tsvangirai and his party may be elongating Zanu-PF’s disastrous rule – and losing touch with a young and impatient generation that has until now been its core constituency.

It remains to be seen if and when that generation takes matters into its own hands.

This is an abridged version of the article published in the August/September 2010 edition of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Journal.