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Interview Part 3: Masamvu, Prof Stanford Mukasa
SW Radio Africa's Violet Gonda talks with Sydney Masamvu, a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group in South Africa and the political commentator Professor Stanford Mukasa in the USA. This is Part 3 and final part of the interview for the Hot Seat programme:
Broadcast on Tuesday, December 12, 2006
Violet Gonda: Thank you for joining us for the final segment of a teleconference discussion with analysts Professor Stanford Mukasa and Sydney Masamvu. In this last episode we dig deeper to see if Robert Mugabe can be an agent for change. Many people have said life under Zanu PF has become an unbearable daily struggle. So I first asked Professor Mukasa if it’s realistic to think a solution can come from the same regime that is said to have brought so much misery and repression.
Professor Mukasa: Life under Zanu PF has been intolerable, as you just stated. The fact of the matter is, life under Zanu PF is intolerable and the question that people are asking now is that ‘is it Zanu PF now that is going to make changes?’ That’s why I said last time that the leopard does not change its spots, but it can wear a jacket. There’s a great deal of deception that is taking place with Mugabe trying to fool the world into thinking that he is doing something to improve the situation when exactly the opposite is the case. Now the question now that we really want to look at by way of answering your question; I think your question should be answered by another question. And, this other question is simply by asking what the opposition should do right now - is to look whether there are any precedents at all. Namely, what have similar situations in the past, how have similar situations in the past been resolved, been taken care of. Because, what is happening in Zimbabwe today is not unique in Zimbabwe. You know incidences of repression have been taking place around the world but somehow they have been resolved. So, what the opposition movement should do now is to look at the past, not only in Zimbabwe but in other countries as well. The MDC; not necessarily the MDC; the opposition movement should have a very strong Research Department that should look at the way similar situations have been addressed and resolved in the past, not only in Zimbabwe but in other countries as well.
Now, when we look at Mugabe, and I agree with Sydney here, he cannot be a factor for change, he cannot be a reason for change, changing the situation that he has created himself. One would expect him to do that because Ian Smith did that exactly in 1979. He became an agent for change. The Nationalist Movement worked with Ian Smith and Muzorewa and at Lancaster House, in 1979, they reached an accommodation. The same thing also happened with PW Botha, well, he died, but his successor De Klerk; he became an agent of change even though he was managing this oppressive apartheid regime. So, in the case of Mugabe obviously, to answer the questions ‘to what extent can he be an agent of change’ well, one is looking at people like the ruler of Yugoslavia who never changed at all.
Violet: Milosevic?
Professor Mukasa: So, to that extent, we need to look at models, you know, how have similar situations been resolved in other countries. To what extent can what happened in other countries be replicated in Zimbabwe? You know, I get very tired with people who keep on saying ‘well, Zimbabwe is different, it cannot be like Madagascar, it cannot be like Togo, it cannot be like Kyrgistan, it cannot be like Haiti, it cannot be like Brazil, it cannot be like all these other countries where people have actually gone to the streets. Well, if Zimbabwe cannot be like any of those countries, what is Zimbabwe like? That becomes my question.
Violet: Now also, let me go back to Sydney, and this is again on the issue of the International Community supporting moderates in Zanu PF. Does this mean that the International Community doesn’t have time and energy to invest in the Zimbabwe democratic enterprise?
Sydney Masamvu: Time and energy. Time; you see Zimbabwe is fighting, you know, competing for attention with other global conflicts or hotspots. The International Community had time, in Congo, and, we have a result; the election and Congo has move on. The International Community is seized to the neck with Darfur, there’s Iraq, there’s Afghanistan. They should look at both leaders of the two super powers, the UK, you look at the US. They are about to exit from office and they are more concerned with their legacies. And also, you are looking at a new breed of leaders coming through being handed over the Zimbabwe sort of unfinished agenda. One would then look at, you see, the international, the world of the international political system; it moves on, say ‘what is the best way forward?’ You end up with going with a 65% sort of ‘yes’ in terms of saying ‘let’s give the benefit of the doubt’. That’s the mode the international community will be pushed into if opposition forces who can bring wholesale, fulsome, democratic change in Zimbabwe do not get their act together. People will then have to be forced. As Zimbabweans we will then also have to make do with what is there.
Believe you me, there’s a growing sentiment and feeling, even within the Southern African region, that anyone other than Mugabe, and we’ve heard this from quite some good authority, anyone, other than Mugabe would be better for Zimbabwe. That’s the mood, which, not only the International Community as well as the region are saying ‘anyone other than Mugabe will push Zimbabwe forward’. So you see, and once it subtracts an individual and it leaves the field open, it means the world is ready to move with anyone. And, it’s not given to the MDC; it’s not given to whatever Opposition faction, that we have the support of the rest of the world. The rest of the world right now is ready to move on with any situation, which arises which gets Mugabe off the plate and working towards democratisation in Zimbabwe. There is fatigue. There is tiredness. There is now a sense that if you get Mugabe out, that’s the starting point of trying to move the process in Zimbabwe. And, they take it as a step, and that’s the danger of saying when people are tired, because there are competing interests within the continent where really there are scales.
In Zimbabwe there are issues of governance, the humanitarian situation; but, when you look at issues like Darfur, there is the whole world sort of transfixed on that issue. And Zimbabwe then looks like a child’s breakfast, but it’s really quite critical issues; issues of governance where the repression is going on. But now, the leaders of the world have come a full circle to say ‘anything which helps to push us forward will do. And, the situation is not helped by the split.
Professor Mukasa: If I may jump in there? There are two major issues that people must consider when it comes to strategies for resolving the situation in Zimbabwe. One is, to what extent is Zimbabwe an international security threat?
Sydney Masamvu: Right.
Professor Mukasa: I mean, to what extent is the situation in Zimbabwe likely to spill over and destabilise the world? That’s point number one. Point number two is: to what extent is the situation in Zimbabwe a truly humanitarian crisis? Those are two sorts of factors that one should be taking into account when you consider international intervention. Now, in the case of Zimbabwe, the International Community does not see Zimbabwe as an international threat. It sees Zimbabwe more like a humanitarian case, but at a lower level relative to places like Darfur and Congo and places like that. To what extent is Zimbabwe an international threat? Economically speaking, Zimbabwe has no resources that could be seen as a strategic economic interest and that’s why you see involvement in Iraq and in Sudan. Sudan has got oil reserves that are likely to compete, in terms of capacity, with those of the traditional Middle East countries.
And so, Zimbabwe is neither a large-scale humanitarian case nor a major international threat in the sense of resources. Because when we talk about threats, we are not only talking about armed warfare and things like that, but we are also talking about things like resources. So, to that extent, Zimbabwe keeps on sinking lower and lower in terms of world priorities. And, quite frankly, the formula that the International Community appears to have adopted on Zimbabwe is, the level and the extent of the international intervention in Zimbabwe will be directly proportional to the level and the extent of the people’s initiative in redressing their own situation.
One thing you can be sure about, and you can take it from me, is, if there was to be massive protests in the streets, and if Mugabe’s army started firing on people (and, I’m not suggesting that people should just sacrifice themselves as cannon fodder to Mugabe’s forces), but, what I’m trying to say is if the situation reaches that proportion where there is massive popular protest against Mugabe with it’s attendant consequences of Mugabe’s army shooting back, you can be sure that the Security Council will be called in, it will have an Emergency Session. You can be sure that Zimbabwe would be on the front page of every major newspaper around the world. You can be sure that the International Community would quickly raise Zimbabwe up the scale of priorities around the world. The ball is now in the court of the Zimbabweans; their degree and level and extent of protests will, to some extent, determine the level and degree of the international intervention. It’s unfortunate that it has to happen this way, but that is the geo-political economic reality of the world as we speak right now.
Violet: And Sydney, what are your views on this? What can we realistically expect from the International Community in forcing changes in Zimbabwe?
Sydney Masamvu: I think they have really done a lot, they have really pushed. Actually when you look at it, the sum effect, I think the International Community has made much more noise, much more advocacy in pushing for change in Zimbabwe. And, as I stated from the outset of this interview, we Zimbabweans have to do the heavy lifting and above all, we have to have a decisive leadership within the Opposition Party which above all is ready to take risks. And, anything short of that, I think the International Community will just sit and wait and sort of wait for the earliest opportunity which moves the issue forward. If Mugabe’s exit and reconfiguration in Zanu PF comes first before democratic forces in Zimbabwe take over, then, as the mood stands, or is right now, and the feeling, they will take the first bus and try to sort of control the gears from within.
Professor Mukasa: If I can jump in there. We need to define what we mean by the International Community. The International Community is not a monolith. The International Community falls into two basic categories. There is the world international community, in the world community sense and by this we are talking about obviously the superpowers, the West, Industrialised countries. But you also have got the International Community in the regional specifically African sense. Here we are now looking at the African Union; we are looking at SADC and other regional organisations in Africa. And, the problem that has arisen is that the African Union, SADC and other African regional organisations are now beginning to tell the International community in the world sense that African problems must be resolved by people of Africa. So, it is within that context that SADC and the African Union have told actually the Western Industrialised countries that ‘look, leave it to us to resolve the Zimbabwe situation’. So, whether Mkapa was real or not real in terms of his mission or mandate on Zimbabwe, but, Mkapa becomes the statement from Africa saying look we don’t want emissaries from the United Nations, we don’t want intervention from America or from the UK, let us do things our own way. We can talk to Mugabe, we can resolve this issue’.
So the strange thing, ironic as it might be, but not surprising, is that the regional organisations; the African Union, have actually shielded Mugabe from the International Community. Because each time the World community want to increase pressure on Mugabe, guess who complains? It’s Mbeki! Guess who complains, it’s AU or SADC! They are saying ‘look, don’t do that, you are going to make the situation in Zimbabwe worse’. What can be worse, worse in Zimbabwe than what is there right now? So the people who have let down, or the groups who have let down the people of Zimbabwe are SADC and the African Union because they are actually shielding.
Look there was a resolution at the United Nations Commission for Human Rights, which was aimed at condemning Mugabe for Human Rights violations. Guess who stood in support of Mugabe? It was Nigeria, it was South Africa. Thabo Mbeki. So, this brings confusing signals to the world community. You know, on one hand you’ve got a group of Zimbabweans in the opposition movement who are saying ‘look, we are suffering here; we need the International Community’s intervention’. And yet, SADC and the African Union are saying ‘look, leave it to us we are going to handle it, we are going to take care of it’.
Right now, as I am speaking, the US policy on Zimbabwe is that SADC should be involved? And why is US deferring to SADC? Simply because SADC has told the US that ‘look, leave it to us, Mugabe is our own, we will reason with him, we will talk him out of it.’ And, when is that going to happen? Well, they say in Africa time is not of any essence at all, let things take their own course and go on and let the people be repressed forever, but we are still talking about it. This is the tragedy of the African regional and continental organisations. Sort of becoming now a shield for this kind of a blatant dictatorship. And, as I said earlier, we should look at the past and see whether there is any precedence. When Idi Amin was butchering people of Uganda, guess what? He was the Chairman of the OAU! So the African leadership also bear a large amount of blame in terms of this lack of resolve in the Zimbabwean context.
Violet: And Professor Mukasa, you know, on the issue of Robert Mugabe not showing any signs that he is leaving any time soon, in your view, what is a more feasible proposition then, between regime reform and regime change?
Professor Mukasa: Well, the desirable path would be regime change but to be realistic one is now looking more at regime reform. Not because one wants that, but one is looking at that simply because the fact that Mugabe might retire. We don’t know if he will retire in 2008, even if he stays on until 2010, we don’t know if he will actually retire. Look what happened to Julius Nyerere. When Julius Nyerere stepped down he still was a political force. The government that came in after Nyerere had stepped down, they could not make any decisions without consulting Nyerere for quite a long time until Nyerere just got tired of it. So, regime reform is the most undesirable method of resolving the situation in Zimbabwe, but, at this point, it looks like this is what one can expect. So, we have got a kind of an aim at the heavens to reach to the mountaintop, sort of scenario. You are aiming at regime change, but ultimately what you are going to get is regime reform.
Violet: And Sydney, finally, in seeking either regime reform change, who are the key actors within or outside Zimbabwe that have the capacity to precipitate reforms or changes.
Sydney Masamvu: Indeed, one cannot look far beyond South Africa as being key in any set up. You don’t have to underestimate the influence of South Africa or indeed SADC as the neighbour to Zimbabwe and a key economic partner. So, one would look at how South Africa will really be key in how events or how the regime will sort of reconfigure itself from within. And, I want to believe that most of these Southern African countries, they are more for regime reform than regime change. I mean, that’s the unfortunate thing which is obtaining now. It’s more looking likely towards regime reform rather than regime change.
And, by extension, countries like SADC may even go on behalf of Zimbabwe to lobby too. You see, what Mukasa was saying, Zimbabwe has sort of been left in the hands of SADC. And, what SADC will endorse, if they endorse, SADC and South Africa, if they endorse a regime reform in Zimbabwe, chances are, that the International Community; that’s the world community, will buy that arrangement. Which now brings the key elements, that’s South Africa and SADC, what they endorse will be taken by the rest of the International Community; the US, the EU and so on. So really, no wonder why you can see now that the focus, the Zimbabwe issue, is now being played multilaterally by South Africa by SADC. And, what SADC recommends to the rest of the world, that’s the one which is going to take root at the end of the day. So really, we are looking at, realistically, as Mukasa said, but undesired; we are looking in the immediate short period regime reform rather than regime change which is a situation which is likely to be obtained in the immediate short term.
Violet: And the key actors within Zimbabwe?
Sydney Masamvu: Within Zimbabwe, definitely Zanu PF as the incumbents, as the party in power will be a key actor. Indeed, the Opposition, whether united or split, and you should take note of this. The two factions will be key because most likely, and as it happens, the regime reform will come through Parliament if the dynamics in Zanu PF are anything to go by with the extension of the harmonisation of the elections, the creation of a Prime Minister’s post and a ceremonial President, we are going to look at Parliament will become the battleground. And, as it is currently configured we are looking at both factions of the MDC, whether united or split, they will be a factor, the ruling Zanu PF as the ruling party or within the traditional factions. And, by the way, you should know that there are three factions; the Mujuru faction, the Mnangagwa faction and the Mugabe faction. Parliament will be the battleground which will yield a regime reform
Violet: And Professor Mukasa, last word?
Professor Mukasa: Ya, I would see on the path to regime reform, I can now see all the interested parties, all the stakeholders, internally we are looking at both factions of the MDC, the Church leaders and we are also looking at representatives of different factions within Zanu PF. Incidentally, the factions within Zanu PF may well be instrumental in the weakening of the hard-line position taken by Mugabe. Why? Because, within Zanu PF you’ve got the Old Guard, and we also have got the new so-called ‘Mafikizolo’, and they probably have got different political interests, so we see those being instrumental in the path towards regime reform.
Regionally, yes I agree with Sydney that South Africa, SADC and the African Union, I think they can be instrumental and hopefully effective in negotiating the accommodation of all the political parties. Of course, internationally, you’re looking at the United States which has been a proponent for this regime reform. But, on the path to regime change, I am looking at the regional civic organisations, you know like COSATU and the civic society in the region. I think those can form very strong groups to agitate for eventual regime change.
I can see regime change coming in two steps. First, the accommodation among the different political parties stakeholders leading to regime reforms. And then later on, a much more consolidated effort towards regime change, maybe through elections. I can see here that if an agreement can be reached in the meantime, in the short-term, for some regime reform that will lead to a process of elections; free and fair elections hopefully internationally supervised and monitored maybe that would put the people on the path to regime change.
Violet:
No, thank you very much Sydney Masamvu and Professor Stanford Mukasa.
Both: Thanks very much.
Audio interview can be heard on SW Radio Africa’s Hot Seat programme. Comments and feedback can be emailed to violet@swradioafrica.com
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