| The best Zimbabwe news site on the world wide web |  |
| NEWS |
| FORUMS |
| NEWS ANALYSIS |
| READERS' FORUM |
What happens when politicians fail?
By
Dr Alex T. Magaisa
IT
IS with a heavy heart, that I consider the possibility, remote as it
might appear, of whether or not it might come to pass, that those in
control of the security structures (of which the military is an integral
part) would consider it appropriate and opportune, to directly assume
the reins of power.
I write not because I think it will happen and certainly not be alarmist but only to remind ourselves, as a people, of the possibilities, so that when we become awake to those possibilities, which can, with time, become probabilities, we take the necessary pre-emptive measures to save the nation from that eventuality.
It is a possibility because it has happened elsewhere before and the risk increases with the growth of conditions that generate and encourage such thoughts and possibilities.
Almost 10 years ago, on 12 February 1998, writing in his Public Eye column of the Financial Gazette newspaper, the late Professor Masipula Sithole, applied his mind to the possibility of a military takeover. At the time, he optimistically predicted that a military takeover was unlikely in Zimbabwe. I thought it would be appropriate to revisit the question that occupied the good Professor’s mind at the time, given the events of the intervening years and the current political and socio-economic climate obtaining in Zimbabwe.
We begin from the position that the security structure is a source of structural power for those who control or are associated with it. Often however, conventional wisdom and practice is that those in the security structure remain professional and serve to defend the Constitution or at least refrain from politics, leaving civilians to take charge of political affairs.
It is however, an inconvenient consequence of the liberation war history, that the security structures are led and populated largely by persons that are also closely connected to the ruling political establishment. One might argue therefore, that the proximity of interests consequent upon history entails that the principle of separation between the military and the civilian political leadership is at best only of theoretical significance. But what are the possibilities when the politicians appear to fail in the political arena?
To deal with the question of why the military intervene in politics, Professor Sithole summarised five theories of which four will be of interest in this article. He referred first to the theory by which it is said that the military would take over on the basis that it considers it its patriotic duty to protect the country from total collapse caused by “inept” and “corrupt” politicians. It assumes of course that the military themselves consider that they are neither “inept” nor “corrupt” and can do a better job.
In this case, the military often argues that it is assuming power on a temporary basis, in order to “clean up” the political system, with promises of a quick return to civilian rule. The Professor asked whether Zimbabwe was experiencing economic collapse in the hands of “corrupt” and “inept” politicians. He did not answer that question in precise terms, but he did indicate that there was economic decline. But whatever the depth of the decline in 1998, it is now well beyond what might have been imagined then. Under this theory alone it would follow that the risk would be higher.
Professor Sithole also referred to Huntingdon’s theory, that the military steps in to fill a void left by the decay of political institutions, particularly the decline of political parties. This is often signified by the fragmentation of the political leadership, which shows itself to be incapable of charting a way forward, in light of general socio-economic deterioration. At the time the Professor wrote, ZANU PF was in decline but certainly not to the extent it is now, given the factionalism threatening to tear it apart.
However, there was no viable opposition, which now exists in the form of the MDC. Unfortunately, the MDC itself appears to be undergoing a form of decay, also the consequence of internal divisions. Thus it would appear at first sight, that the political institutions are undergoing decay. Does this mean therefore, that there is a void, resulting from the decay of political institutions, which the military would be inclined to fill? Or more appropriately, is the military concerned about the decay of political institutions and the way the civilian politicians are conducting political affairs?
The third theory referred to by Professor Sithole, is that of Decalo, whose view was that a military takeover is driven by the vices of greed, corruption and the pursuit of self-interest of individual generals or sections of the military. The question then is whether or not there are sufficient levels of such vice in the military ranks, that would drive the men and women in uniform to takeover direct control of political power?
The Professor also referred to the idea that the military takes over where it identifies a “significant constituency of discontent” that would be large enough to lend support for its actions. This might happen, for example, where the politicians alienate popular support and erect impediments to legal channels for change. It is assumed that opportunists in the military would then take advantage and act as if they were representing this “significant constituency of discontent”.
Is there a “significant constituency of discontent” in Zimbabwe that feels alienated and unable to express its choices through legal channels? Probably, but would such a significant constituency of discontent lend its support to a military takeover? Perhaps not, given that this is a system of government that Zimbabweans have never had and experience elsewhere suggests that it is no better. But then again, it is difficult to predict, with any measure of accuracy, the behaviour of people in desperate situations.
All these are complex questions that lend themselves to varying opinions. I am not one to theorise much or to restrict understanding to a single theoretical line, preferring a more eclectic approach to issues. In this respect, it cannot be correct to consider the above theories individually because they are invariably inter-connected. In the case of Zimbabwe, it could be argued that the conditions envisaged in each theoretical line are evident. So, yes, there is great economic collapse and “inept” and “corrupt” politicians, yes, there is a large constituency of discontent and yes, there are significant personal interests to safeguard, and one would therefore have to consider the issue in a more holistic fashion. The collective failure of politicians to arrest the socio-economic decline coupled with the uncertainty over their capacity to do in the near future, poses a risk.
The situation is not made better by the fact that over the years, ex-military personnel and by extension, the military have populated the civilian institutions and therefore have had a taste of political power and control. Perhaps in an attempt to keep the military onside, the government has tended to cede control of a number of institutions to retired security personnel, while some have indeed become fully-fledged politicians. Yet others still have become powerful business moguls.
Although these men and women are no longer strictly part of the security structures, they arguably have close links and retain influence in the security ranks. That they have slowly but surely made their way into political institutions might be considered a latent takeover in itself, a point that Professor Sithole in 1998. Yet there remains a possibility, even if limited at this stage, that should civilian politicians continue to demonstrate failure, those with an inclination to use force, might find an excuse to have more direct control and influence.
The flexing of powers by the military has also been witnessed on some occasions, of which the most conspicuous was the episode in January 2002, when during the heated Presidential Campaign security chiefs appeared to declare publicly, that they would only support and salute as President and Commander of the Defences Forces, a person who effectively had liberation credentials, referring of course to someone who had fought in the liberation war. MDC’s Tsvangirai, the chief challenger did not go to war and therefore lacked the necessary liberation credentials.
We will never know what might have happened had Mr Tsvangirai succeeded to become President. In that event would the security chiefs have instigated a takeover or was it simply a threat? And does this question still hang above the fortunes of politicians who do not meet the liberation war qualifications? Much, I suppose, would depend on the attitude of the rank and file in the security forces, of which little is known, outside the veneer of loyalty and intermittent reports of discontent as the economic difficulties continue to bite.
One hopes, of course, that it does not come to that, given the battered image that the country has earned in recent years. While military takeovers have in the past been commonplace in some parts of Africa, the phenomenon has been conspicuously rare in the Southern African region. When there was mutiny in the Lesotho military, which threatened the establishment decided in 1998, South Africa was very quick to intervene and prevent what would have been a military takeover. Internationally, there are of course, situations of military takeover that appear to have received general acceptance, such as in Pakistan where General Musharaf has been in power since the military takeover in 1999.
When Professor Sithole wrote in 1998 he argued that a military takeover in Zimbabwe was unlikely since the military had a professional reputation to protect. He also thought that just as the Zanu PF leadership had listened to the demands of the unarmed power base of the war veterans in 1997, it would eventually listen to the “whispers” of its political supporters and the military.
But what if, in the midst of a severe crisis, the “whispers” the Professor referred to are ignored? While President Mugabe appears to retain the command and support of the security structures, a question has to be asked whether the same allegiance extends to those waiting in the wings. It would appear that the anointed one is he or she that can command similar allegiance. A source of trouble however, is if there is a division of loyalties in the security forces along the lines of factionalism raging in ZANU PF.
This is why perhaps, Professor Sithole thought (by way of counsel, I suspect) that the military might wish to protect its professional reputation by avoiding the factional fights in the political arena. I suspect Professor Sithole argued as he did more in hope that those otherwise inclined to military takeover would not do so.
But then, at that time, perhaps the extent and impact of politicians’ failure had not manifested as it now has and the decay of political institutions had not become evident as it now does, the hopelessness had not set in as it now has and the military had not tasted political power as it now has. Only the future will tell, but one hopes politicians can settle the political question and spare the country the possibility of military rule. The best form of defence against such an eventuality is for politicians to find solutions to the problems in their arena
Dr Magaisa can be contacted at wamagaisa@yahoo.co.uk
All material copyright newzimbabwe.com
Material may be published or reproduced in any form with appropriate credit to this website