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South Africa's self-serving quiet diplomacy By
Dr Alex T. Magaisa A commonly cited explanation is that it follows the usual pattern of African leaders of the liberation era using the cover of African solidarity and comradeship sown during the days of the struggle against colonial rule. But, there is more to the story in the case of SA and Zimbabwe, which probably accounts for SA’s velvet glove approach to the Zimbabwean government. And instead of ignoring the plight of their neighbours up north, South Africans have cause to worry. As I see it, SA’s reluctance to take an active role arises from its own circumstances, which closely reflect those of pre-crisis Zimbabwe, and it is these shared circumstances that make it difficult for the SA leadership to take a bold stand against the Zimbabwean leadership. There is a measure of selfishness on the part of the SA leadership, who although uncomfortable with the tactics and results of the actions of the Zimbabwean leadership, share similar ideas in relation to the challenge redressing the colonial legacy if unequal wealth distribution. The SA leadership finds itself incapable of asserting any moral leverage over the Zimbabwean regime because in their eyes the Zimbabwean leadership has done no more than they (in SA) would like to do. Besides their physical proximity, Zimbabwe and SA share a similar colonial history and legacy, which is not common elsewhere in Africa, of a large white population, co-existing, rather uneasily it must be said, with the new black leadership. Compared to the rest of Africa, they were among the last colonies to achieve independence. They both share a key factor that at independence, there remained the unresolved question of resource distribution between the black and white populations. So even in the relative stability of present day SA, beyond the frenzy of the “Rainbow Nation”, there is myriad of unresolved questions and contradictions, which threaten to unravel with the passage of time. In this context, we know that there are things that the SA leadership would like to do but has not yet done, for fear of disturbing the current balance. They know that the Zimbabwean leadership has done these things that it would like to do, and although this has had disastrous consequences, they still find it hard to rise to the top of the mountain and admonish what they would like to do, given the opportunities. The SA leadership is aware of the great challenges it faces, particularly given that the needs and expectations of the people are beginning to escalate into demands. Yet it faces a dilemma, knowing that any sudden change Zimbabwe-style is likely to affect the stability of its economic base but also that any further prevarication is likely to draw the ire of those whose expectations have not been fulfilled, 13 years into independence. Hard as it might appear to believe, President Mugabe still retains some admirers among considerable numbers of Africans who choose to view his actions through the prism of anti-imperialism. Similarly, by virtue of SA’s circumstances and the views held by the SA government that probably closely resemble those of the Zimbabwean government, at least in principle, the lens through which the SA government views the Zimbabwean problem are different from the lens through which the West and other international observers or indeed the bulk of the opposition in Zimbabwe sees the same issue. There is a selfish basis for SA’s approach, which is apparent in its oft-repeated line that the Zimbabwe’s problems are best solved by Zimbabweans themselves and do not require outsiders. SA appears to be suggesting the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of Zimbabwe. But what is the difference between Zimbabwe and Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Burundi and even Haiti where SA appears to have taken a bolder approach in the past? The difference is that the SA leadership is keen to intervene more “loudly” where its self-interest is not at stake. Unlike others where it has intervened boldly, the Zimbabwe issue presents a sensitive challenge to its own interests and designs. There is in this, an unspoken message to the rest of the world, that SA would prefer non-intervention should issues similar to those in Zimbabwe arise within its own confines. SA is doing to Zimbabwe, what it would want others to do unto it, should similar issues arise. This must worry those in SA and others with an interest in the country, because SA does not seem to know how to handle and satisfy the growing expectations and demands of its formerly marginalised population. The conduct of the ANC suggests that it identifies and sympathises with the Zanu PF as opposed to the opposition MDC, which it probably views in the same vein as its own internal opposition. South Africans must ask themselves whether this identification and sympathy extends beyond ideas to adopting similar tactics and approaches towards the opposition. Does the ANC, like Zanu PF, view the opposition as nothing more than puppets of imperialism? The real source of support for Zimbabwe is the people of South Africa themselves, who can if the have the will, influence their own government to take a bolder approach. To be sure, South Africans must call on their government to do more to address the legacy of apartheid and colonialism beyond the cosmetic Black Economic Empowerment which has been hijacked as has happened elsewhere in Africa by a minority class of blacks. But if there is one lesson the can learn from their northern neighbour, it is that they must demand their government to address the issue in a properly planned way. They must not allow their plight to be used by a failing ruling party to launch a campaign camouflaged in the rhetoric of anti-imperialism. The irony is that having stood by all along while Zimbabwe’s attempt has failed, the SA leadership appears to have put itself in a difficult position, because every move it makes towards resolving the key questions of inequality is likely to be viewed with suspicion. There will always be the question whether SA is becoming another Zimbabwe. The people themselves must remind their government to stop quitting responsibilities via quiet diplomacy, which has failed to address the questions. By taking a leadership role to resolve the Zimbabwean crisis, the SA government might just place itself in a stronger position to deal with similar difficult internal questions it undoubtedly faces. On the other hand by failing to take up the responsibility, it is unwittingly weakening its own position by lowering its estimation in the eyes of fellow members of the community, both regional and international, especially given that it will be required, inevitably to deal with these tough questions. SA can state more strongly the case for its disadvantaged citizens and inspire confidence by demonstrating that, while it understands the ideas behind wealth redistribution attempted by its Zimbabwean counterparts, it does not approve of the manner in which it has been done and would prefer another way that is less destructive of the economic well-being of the people in whose favour the whole exercise is meant to be done.. But then again, does the South African leadership consider that they have the moral leverage to challenge the actions of their Zimbabwean counterparts? I doubt it, though it would be a pleasant surprise if it happens otherwise. Dr Magaisa can
be contacted at wamagaisa@yahoo.co.uk |
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