Sanctions could strangle Zimbabwe 'baby' at birth

Sanctions could strangle Zimbabwe 'baby' at birth

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By Alex T. Magaisa

THERE is a sense, after the so-called ‘Historic Handshake’ between Morgan Tsvangirai and Robert Mugabe on 21 July 2008, that Zimbabwe has reached an ‘oasis moment’.

It is that point in a long and treacherous trip in the Sahara when, thirsty and weary, one suddenly sees a canopy of palm trees in the distant horizon, a sign that, perhaps, finally you have come across an oasis, a source of renewal.

Such moments invoke an eclectic mixture of emotions - hopes, dreams and also, fears. One is energised by the thought of salvation from the torture of the desert elements. But there is also the fear that the oasis may be no more than a mirage; that fatigue may be the great impediment to reaching the oasis. That is why, in the language of the desert, they talk of dying of thirst when the palm trees appear in the horizon.

And so it is that for the first time in ten years, a troubled journey of few highs and many lows, Zimbabweans can see the palm trees in the horizon. But their reaction to the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for negotiations between the country’s political rivals is laced with cautious optimism or to put it more bluntly, scepticism.

That is not surprising. For a people failed so many times before by politicians, scepticism is the best insurance policy against likely disappointment. You do not raise your hopes too high. You always leave room in your heart to say, ‘Anyway, I knew it would never work’. Zimbabweans have been mentally scarred too many times before; they have seen lofty dreams turn into nightmares. So, now, they say, simply, ‘tege-e tichiona’ (we will wait and see).

But beyond questions over the sincerity and genuine will of the politicians, there is something else that is not obvious in the equation of Zimbabwe’s future that will determine the success or failure of this current endeavour.

It is the fact that Zimbabwean politicians, let alone the Zimbabwean citizens generally, no longer hold the country’s economic fate in their own hands. One of the consequences of Zanu PF’s failures is that it has so impoverished the people and made them so powerless and left the country ever more vulnerable to the whims of external forces.

There is the circumstance, therefore, that a political deal between Zimbabweans will, ultimately, depend on whether it is deemed acceptable by the international community and in particular, the economically powerful West. And there is no guarantee that it will. Zimbabweans thus face a scenario where their politicians might agree to do a deal but find, ultimately, that it will not be deemed acceptable by some members of the community of nations. Africa is likely to take any deal that ensures some stability. It is not clear that the West would take the same position.

Zimbabwe’s economic collapse has resulted largely from poor policies, incompetence and corruption on the part of government. But it also suffered heavily from financial and economic ostracisation in the community of nations.

Although the mantra is that Zimbabwe is subjected only to targeted travel and financial sanctions against select members of the Zimbabwe government, the reality is that Zimbabwe as a country has largely been ostracised by the international financial institutions and multi-lateral development banks.

By September 2000, international financial institutions and multi-lateral development banks, including the IMF, had effectively shut avenues for financial support and credit to Zimbabwe, except, perhaps for humanitarian purposes. They certainly had their good reasons for taking those measures but this exclusion combined with local incompetence and corruption to cause a brutally slow and painful demise of the Zimbabwean economy.

A closer look at one of the key legislative instruments that provide a backdrop to the financial ostracisation, namely the US Congress’ Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA), gives some indication as to why the outcome of the talks is, ultimately, dependent on the goodwill and support of the international community.

ZIDERA effectively blocks, through the executive directors representing the US in international financial institutions, “support that is intended to promote Zimbabwe’s economic recovery and development, the stabilisation of the Zimbabwe dollar, and the viability of Zimbabwe’s democratic institutions”.

This is, it must be emphasised, a separate set of measures from the targeted travel sanctions against individuals as provided for under Section 6 of ZIDERA and which this article does not specifically address.

Any change to the US policy in respect of economic support from the international financial institutions under this law ultimately rests on the certification by the US President that certain conditions have been satisfied in Zimbabwe. These conditions include:

• restoration of the rule of law, which includes respect for property rights and the cessation of Government-backed violence;
• that there is an internationally-monitored and recognised free and fair presidential election in accordance with international standards;
• equitable, legal and transparent land reform program consistent with agreements of the 1998 Donors’ Conference;
• End to involvement in the DRC war;
• Demilitarisation of the civil arms of government and subordination of the military to the civilian government.

It follows, therefore, that, unless these conditions are satisfied, there remains the possibility that US policy would not change. In this particular case, it is unlikely that an internationally monitored and acceptable presidential election will be held in the short term and may, at best, only come at the end of a transitional period.

If the US were to insist that this condition must be fulfilled to the letter before dispensing with the financial/economic restrictions towards Zimbabwe, that might well strangle the new baby at birth. If the transitional authority remains cut-off from the channels of support from international financial institutions, and multi-lateral development banks, its stability and prospects of economic recovery will be severely limited.

The trouble is neither Zanu PF nor the MDC have the capacity to determine the policy decisions of the US and the EU in these matters. They have their own reasons for imposing the sanctions and they also have their own domestic constituencies to account to for their actions. For this reason, the situation is that talks will have to address the issues raised not simply by Zimbabweans but also those issues that may be raised by the West. The possibility of clashes is not insignificant.

Yet the threat of sanctions requires careful treatment. It remains a potent tool for the MDC in the negotiations, a dagger above the head of Zanu PF which impels them to negotiate and find common ground. That’s because the sanctions regime effectively strengthens the hand of Zanu PF’s greatest challenger – the economy.

Mugabe can fight his human foes. He has shown that. But he knows also that there is one foe; one dogged challenger who won’t give up – he knows the economy is the hardest of punchers. In boxing parlance, they would probably say the economy is now throwing a series of combinations and Mugabe is hanging on the ropes, unable to defend, let alone fight back, waiting desperately for the bell, a bell that will give him a breather. That bell will energise him to, perhaps, make another remarkable comeback. That is why talks are important to him and Zanu PF. The talks are to Mugabe what the bell is to the beleaguered boxer.

But will the transitional arrangement survive the vagaries of the two-year dry economic season, if the West does not accept the deal? The conception of the talks paraded amid smiles and handshakes; the birth and immediate aftermath could be a more sombre affair; a lot, perhaps, like the millions of African babies who appear only briefly to catch a glimpse of the world and then are seen no more. But, as always, we wait in hope, cautious hope.

Alex Magaisa is based at Kent Law School, The University of Kent, UK and can be contacted at wamagaisa@yahoo.co.uk
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