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Not a united opposition, but managing army is the challenge
By
Itai Zimunya
AS THE Zimbabwean crisis continues to deepen and widen as displayed
by the acute shortages of food, local and foreign currency, fuel and
jobs, calls for the resolution of the political crisis seem to be growing.
The most particular call of recent days is that opposition political parties ought to unite and form a strong front that can successfully challenge Zanu PF from power.
However, after assessing
the current balance of power in Zimbabwe, we content that it is not
a united opposition that is the missing link in Zimbabwe. Whilst it
has merit, it is not the touchstone. Some celebrated political thinkers,
including Masipula Sithole, Alfred Stepan and Jonathan Moyo prescribe
that the opposition need to engage a section of democrats in Zanu PF
and move towards a process of sustainable democratic transformation.
The big question, however, is how, when and by whom shall this materialise.
To adequately answer the above questions, it is important to analyse
the balance of power in Zimbabwe, from which we will derive the political
formula. A close look at the outcomes of the 2000, 2002 and 2005 general
and presidential elections reveal that Zanu PF does not have an active
majority of people in Zimbabwe. The opposition, despite its activists
being targets of political violence, has matched Zanu PF in every district.
In fact, various electoral reports to the 2000 and 2002 national elections
state that, had it not been the use of violence and manipulation, Zanu
PF would have “lost power”.
One eminent political scholar, Brian Raftopoulos argues that there are
two political personalities that shape Zimbabwe’s polity, Robert
Mugabe and Morgan Tsvangirai. Like John Makumbe predicted, Morgan Tsvangirai
is leading in the “numbers game” but seems to have failed
to capitalise on this popularity to affect the political environment
in Zimbabwe. Various factors contribute to this failure. These include
the mere presence of a counter power, Mugabe and the threat of the manipulated
state killing machinery.
This scale of demographic support to the MDC and Zanu PF dismisses one
aspect for calling for a united opposition because the problem in Zimbabwe
is not a numerical minority of the opposition supporters. Masipula Sithole
and Jonathan Moyo agree that the power lies in the elite coercive apparatus,
the military, and this coercive apparatus is controlled by the ruling
Zanu PF elite. The challenge therefore is how to unlock this coercive
power, the military without a war.
Stepan suggests that the opposition needs to focus more on increasing
the process of authoritarian erosion than focusing more on the total
collapse of the regime. In this thinking, he noted five groups in any
authoritarian regime in transition. These include, a) core supporters
of the regime, b) the coercive apparatus i.e, the military, intelligence
and the police, c) the regimes active opponents i.e the opposition activists
like the MDC, ZAPU etc d) the regimes passive supporters, i.e the business
community and, e) the regimes passive opponents such as the educated
workers and academics and sections of the church.
From the above classification, it can be argued that the power in Zimbabwe
lies in a zone that is beyond electoral formations. That is why some
political commentators posit that the MDC won the 2002 presidential
election but Zanu PF retained power.
At present, the majority of Zimbabweans seem to be fed up with the Zanu
PF regime, but for many reasons, they passively put up with the political
rot. It is important to highlight that at Tsholotsho, the media reported
that six Zanu PF provinces had agreed that Mugabe had to go. In essence,
these provinces agreed that there is a need for democratic reform in
Zimbabwe. The failure of the Tsholotsho declaration may be that those
resolutions had no support of the coercive force, the military.
After the Tsholotsho declaration, Jonathan Moyo pointed out that there
was a bigger opposition within Zanu PF. Therefore other opposition political
parties, the Movement for Democratic Change specifically, needed to
engage a section of democrats in Zanu PF to finally rest the Zimbabwean
crisis. Reactions to Jonathan Moyo’s proposition were negative.
The proposal was not dismissed because of its emptiness, but because
of the anger of his link to the promulgation of obnoxious pieces of
legislation, the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act
(AIPPA) and the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) during his stint
as Minister of Information in Mugabe’s government.
In other words, Jonathan Moyo is revealing that there are many people
in Zanu PF that have either degraded themselves or have been degraded
from active supporters of that party into passive supporters. It means,
if there were no fear of reproach, they would have left to join the
opposition. Masipula Sithole proposes solutions to this dilemma.
Writing the Public Eye, in the Financial Gazette of 8 January 1998,
Masipula Sithole says, “ … members of the coercive elite
are the major agents of change”. He further states that a combination
of democrats from both inside and outside Zanu PF may well be the source
of a more enduring democratisation process.
Therefore, it is the duty of the opposition to prove that an alternative
establishment is a viable option. This will most likely diminish the
Zanu PF fear of change and enlist them as active opponents leaving the
coercive force a neutralised force.
Equally, it would be naïve for any of the two Zanu PF factions,
that of Mnangagwa or Mujuru to think that they can go it alone in the
post Mugabe era. Zanu PF, in whatever form needs to realise and acknowledge
the presence and permanence of opposition politics in Zimbabwe. Wishes
of a super Zanu PF in government must be taken as mere dreams. There
could be a motivation for democrats in Zanu PF to realise this and begin
to make strategic contacts with the opposition.
In this case, the two Zanu PF factions have two options, and time is
fast running out on them. They either have to mend relations or compete
to make collective deals with the opposition, especially the MDC. Option
number one is almost impossible because of the levels of mistrust and
economic attacks that have been made including the purge on the financial
sector and the post Tsholotsho sanctions on pro-Mnangagwa actors.
The second option is real but very risky, especially in the presence
of Mugabe. Mugabe has personally declared Morgan Tsvangirai and the
MDC as enemies that “must be crushed”. He means it and anyone
that entertains the MDC is a sell out that must receive the highest
form of punishment. This is why South African President Mbeki’s
quiet diplomacy failed. That is also noted as the main problem behind
the stagnation in political dialogue among political actors in Zimbabwe.
The main player of this option is therefore Robert Mugabe himself.
Assuming Mugabe away, expectations of the army causing confusion are,
in this case, remote for several reasons. Chiefly, the army is viewed
as part of the succession jigsaw and there is no consensus at present
among the army generals of which Zanu PF faction to support. Secondly,
tribal politics form an integral part of the Zanu PF succession debate
and thus, because the army is not immune to tribalism, it is affected.
The third factor is that the army is loyal and not naïve. They
are loyal to Zimbabwe, and support a peaceful political transformation,
which they also highly expect given the current economic downfall.
These facts confirm perceptions that Mugabe is a stumbling block to
Zimbabwe’s political transition, both within Zanu PF and at national
level. It is this perception (if not reality) that justifies the calls,
both within Zanu PF and in the opposition that Mugabe must go. He must
rest and pave way for intra-Zanu PF reform, which can not be disassociated
with national reform.
In realisation of this Mugabe factor, Jonathan Moyo, despite being a
political gymnast, argues that the political leadership in the opposition
political parties must realise the existence of a big opposition currently
sitting in Zanu PF. It has to be strategically captured and this reflects
a greater chance for quicker and more stable political reforms. Should
these talks fail, though it is remote, there could be a super intra
Zanu PF agreement for power sharing among the warring Mujuru and Mnangagwa
factions.
An intra-Zanu PF power-sharing agreement is the last thing that Zimbabwe
expects because it could mean suffer continues to the masses and looting-continue
to the political sultans.
An all-out MDC government is possible more as a theory than in reality
in the short term, though it is possible in the medium term. Whilst
the opposition has the active support of the masses more than Zanu PF,
it is the military aspect that is the stumbling block. It is the key
that one faction of Zanu PF presents. This presentation brings with
it avenues for the making of a new democratic constitution leading to
free and fair elections.
This is the fourth way. It presupposes the existence of three other
possible avenues of political development in Zimbabwe. These include
a), maintenance of the status quo, b) total power to the opposition
without Zanu PF, and c), domination of Zanu PF with a subdued opposition
in parliament, the senate and city councils.
Analyses of these possible options reveal that hopes of an all Zanu
PF or an all MDC government is a mirage. Such a scenario does not cherish
multi-partism and is constructed around a one-party-state manifesto
base. A political system that has made Zimbabwe wilt under Mugabe, the
Alpha and Omega of Zanu PF. Option three represents cosmetic democracy
where a dictator displays and celebrates the holding of elections according
to the constitutional calendars and celebrates minority and insignificant
opposition representation in parliament, in the senate and in local
government authorities as a sign of peoples will.
The fourth way is inevitable and history is with Zimbabwe. In reference
to Africa and Zimbabwe in particular, socio-political transition can
not be done in a mathematical formula of total elimination of the status
quo. That is why in 1980, the patriotic front had to join hands with
the former oppressors and enter into a new phase of politics. South
Africa is another model of the fourth way, where in 1994, the emerging
revolutionary power engaged a section of the oppressive machinery to
facilitate reforms. This is possible in Zimbabwe, despite the existence
of extreme resentment both among the cadres of the opposition and those
that are benefiting from free government funds.
It has to be noted however, that such a move must not be used to crush
other political opinions. Opposition politics, in the case of Zimbabwe
must be encouraged to provide the balance of power. For a meaningful
implementation of this proposal, issues of transitional justice must
be visited, where victims of socio-economic and political violence are
compensated and perpetrators brought to book.
This proposition is believed to be the reverse of what South African
President had prescribed for Zimbabwe. It is believed that during the
2003 MDC-Zanu PF dialogue, it was Mbeki’s plan to sideline Morgan
Tsvangirai, seen as a hard-liner, and bring a section of the MDC into
a coalition government with Zanu PF. This, as it did, was doomed to
fail for several reasons. The reasons include the exclusion of ordinary
Zimbabweans from participating in the transitional process and the reluctance
of the domineering Zanu PF from using force as a tool of governance.
So the people remained suspicious, and I think will remain suspicious
of any formation that is dominated by Zanu PF because to them Zanu PF
represents hunger, oppression, torture and violence.
The best way forward for Zimbabwe demands a careful cost-benefit analysis
of any such political moves. Political dialogue is inevitable. Just
like there is a cease-fire in any struggle, it might be time for such
in Zimbabwe. Time and accuracy are important, as any delay might be
dangerous to both the ruling elite and the opposition. As the world
allies and the political horses begin to get tired, it exposes and weakens
many political movements. For the opposition, a long struggle has the
danger of creating an opposition within an opposition as the foot-soldiers
begin to get tired and disillusioned, then turning against their own
masters and losing discipline.
The other present initiative of making a national vision document by
the Church complement the calls for a new democratic constitution in
addition to setting value based standards for a future Zimbabwe. Mass
action is best as a threat in Zimbabwe, and mostly as spasmodic and
sporadic comical displays of the dictator’s weakness than as a
popular front for regime change. Sporadic action presents a counter
military headache than a formalised revolution that can be crashed using
conventional defence operations. The final push of June 2003 must serve
as a lesson.
In conclusion, and from a nationalist perspective, it may be time Zimbabweans
recognise and appreciate their political differences and begin to work
towards people-inclusive dialogue. Every day is a painful day for Zimbabweans
despite Gono’s Operation Sunrise and his sugar promise of a better
Zimbabwe buoyed by bearer cheques. Die hards like Robert Mugabe, that
have master minded Zimbabwe’s downfall over the last 26 years
must be assisted to go by both opposition sections within and without
Zanu PF, the international community and by the church.
Lastly, any mediated
settlement on the Zimbabwean crisis must address the constitutional
vacuum created by the amended Lancaster House constitution that Zanu
PF claims to be Zimbabwean. Any failure to visit the constitutional
question means the struggles continue for Zimbabweans. And it shall
continue for it is our birthright.
Itai Zimunya is a former university student leader and human rights
activist
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