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Primacy of internal factors in Zimbabwe's transformation
By
Dr
Sehlare Makgetlaneng
THE PURPOSE OF THE WORK
THE Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), the main opposition political party in Zimbabwe, is characterised by theoretical and practical weaknesses.
It has not waged a decisive war against these weaknesses in its struggle for state political power. It is characterised by a profound failure to understand and recognise the importance of the primacy of internal factors over the external factors either in the resolution or the maintenance of Zimbabwe’s socio-political and economic problems.
Its theoretical and practical weaknesses serve as its lessons in its struggle for state political power. To do justice to its struggle for political power, it must wage a decisive war against these weaknesses. These weaknesses are key challenges it is facing in its struggle to defeat the ruling party, Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU – PF).
The MDC does not in practice do justice to its position that the ruling party has been using violent or repressive measures and manipulating and rigging elections so as to win them. The fact that it has been maintaining this position is such that if it is sincere in maintaining it and wanted to do justice to it in practice, it should have decided and implemented decision to go beyond its parliamentary opposition tactics or electoral, constitutional route.
One of the key questions is whether it has ever raised the question as to whether it was possible for the ruling party to use violent or repressive measures and manipulate and rig elections so as to win them. Related to this question is another key question as to whether if it was convinced that it was possible or obvious that the ruling party was going to use violence, repression particularly against itself and manipulate and rig elections so as to win them what was its proposed programme of action against these measures.
Our work focuses on the MDC’s profound failure to understand and recognise the importance of the primacy of internal factors over the external factors in the resolution of Zimbabwe’s socio-political and economic problems. Directly related to this failure, is the fact that the MDC has not recognised in theory and practice the strategic importance of mobilising for political, economic and ideological hegemony and has been unable to provide comprehensive theoretical and practical alternatives to the ruling party as prerequisites to the realisation of its objective to be the ruling party. It has refused to fundamentally transform itself to serve as the social agent for change.
This work excludes the MDC faction led by Professor Arthur Mutambara. Mutambara and Morgan Tsvangirai have not yet effectively articulated political and policy programmes which constitute the qualitative leap forward in the struggle for the resolution of Zimbabwe’s problems. They have not yet answered the question as to what is to be done in formulating, adopting and implementing the appropriate tactics for achieving state political power so as to effect socio-political and economic change. They have not yet convinced the masses of the people of Zimbabwe that theirs is the realisation of changes in power relations in socio-political, economic and institutional terrains and in the material and non-material aspects of their individual and collective life conditions. Tsvangirai still defends the MDC’s Restart: Our Path to Social Justice, the economic programme for Reconstruction, Stabilisation, Recovery and Transformation, which is not theoretically exciting and which cannot be regarded by the considerable number of the people of Zimbabwe as their proud theoretical and ideological national product in their struggle for the resolution of their problems.
INTRODUCTION
The MDC is the historical child of Zimbabwe’s socio-political and economic problems. It has proved that it is incapable of solving these problems which were responsible for its coming into existence. Zimbabwe adopted and implemented the structural adjustment programme in the 1990s. It substantially reversed its socio-economic achievements made since political independence. The structural adjustment programme required the state to, among others, reduce the seize of the civil service, subsidies to parastatals and social and economic services. The state directed its priorities at trade liberalisation, export promotion, privatization of many of its assets and investment promotion.
The substantial decline in the further development and output of manufacturing industry, substantial increase in imports and decline in exports, decline in wages, increase in unemployment and the cost of food, health care, transport and education, and the unprecedented inability of the majority of households to afford the basic necessities such as food, clothing, shelter and transport were some of the consequences of the structural adjustment programme. Workers, poor people and professionals were negatively affected by these socio-economic problems. These socio-economic problems Zimbabwe faced in the 1990s not only led to strikes and demonstrations by the masses of the people, but also the alliance consisting of various social forces and organisations which led to the formation of the MDC.2
The MDC became the beneficiary of these socio-economic problems in the 1990s and the early 2000s, demands by popular social forces and organisations for the state to solve them and the failure by the state to solve them. They are some of the key reasons behind its achievements in the 2000 and 2002 elections. Its achievements in these elections have been substantially reversed. They have not been consolidated since the 2002 presidential elections. Since 2003 the MDC failed to prove that it is politically capable of solving Zimbabwe’s socio-economic problems. It has failed to prove that it is capable to provide the alternative political administrative of the society. As this work demonstrates it has refused to accept strategic advice it has been provided with.
Munyaradzi Gwisai, its former Member of Parliament, and his colleagues provided it with the strategic advice in 2001. Gwisai maintains that leaders of the International Socialist Organisation in 2001 told the MDC leaders that “unless they immediately changed their strategy of opposing the land reform programme and hanging on the aprons of white farmers, capitalists, the West and the International Monetary Fund and instead adopt anti-neo-liberal anti-imperialist stance they would be buried in future elections even without violence.”3 The MDC has refused to accept this strategic advice and accordingly formulate and implement appropriate tactics.
The MDC has not forged working relations with progressive political parties and civil society organisations throughout the Southern African region, African continent and beyond. Its closer working relations with conservative and moderate political parties, civil society organisations which support it politically, morally and financially has prevented it from forging working relations with progressive political parties and civil society organisations throughout the Southern African region, African continent and beyond. It has also prevented it from adopting and implementing viable or progressive strategies and tactics as well as direct programmes of actions such as mass action. Its socio-economic policies are not fundamentally different from those of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank – multilateral organisations whose primary task is to advance the interests of neo-colonialism and imperialism. Its views of democracy and political good governance are fundamentally not different from those of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The World Bank’s democracy and political good governance principles shape its position on democracy and political good governance.4 Its political platform includes many of demands of democracy and political good governance defined by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.5
The MDC lacks viable or progressive strategy and tactics and programme of action promoting and advancing popular national demands. It has refused to learn a lesson provided by both reactionary and revolutionary forces throughout the world. This lesson is the primacy of internal factors over external factors in any political, economic and ideological struggle. This reality means that the responsibility either to solve or to maintain socio-political and economic problems in any particular country lies internally within it, not externally outside it. This means that it lies on the shoulders of its people, not on the shoulders of the people of other countries.
CRITICISM OF THE MDC AS ITS ADVICE
The MDC has been advised by a considerable number of individuals and organisations, including its supporters, internally in Zimbabwe and externally. This advice has been offered to the MDC through criticism of its theoretical and practical weaknesses. It rejected this advice and, in the process, refused to wage a decisive war against these weaknesses in its struggle for state political power.
Barney Mthombothi maintains the position that the MDC has not yet learned this lesson or the primacy of internal factors over external factors either in the resolution or in the maintenance of socio-political and economic problems. He maintains this position in his article on why “Mugabe still wields power.”6 He maintains that Tsvangirai’s “diplomatic shuttle” across Southern Africa in the late 2004 was “a waste of time.” His point is that there was “nothing he said in person to the leaders” of Southern Africa that “could not have been relayed down a telephone line” and that “the trip” was “more about Tsvangirai – an attempt at enhancing his status, his own stature – than enlightening people on the current situation in Zimbabwe.”
The importance of the trip is that it exposed or highlighted “the shortcomings of the struggle” led by the MDC against the ruling party. Instead of mobilising its supporters, the MDC “has been wasting time on fervent pleas to the international community.” Tsvangirai and his colleagues should recognise the reality in practice that the masses of the people of Zimbabwe are “the fount of their credibility, legitimacy, power and authority” and that when “the masses are properly mobilised no autocrat, no matter how powerful or repressive, can rule them against their will for any length of time.” He concludes that the MDC’s “tactic so far has been to appeal for international assistance in the form of sanctions and boycotts without a concomitant intensive mobilisation of the masses within the country” and that this tactic is incorrect in that it fails to come to grips with the reality that the “home front is the theatre, the crucible, of the struggle” or that the “engine of the opposition is in Zimbabwe, not outside”7 the country.
The position articulated by Mthombothi is basically advice to the MDC. The point is that, as Alex T. Magaisa, a Zimbabwean lawyer, maintains, the MDC has “became misdirected in its strategy and approach to the issues facing the country.” It has “found itself between two constituencies – on the one hand, the people of Zimbabwe and secondly the international community.” The consequence of this development is that it became a “captured” movement – responding more to the demands and concerns of the international community and less to the daily concerns of the local people. It became distant and its leaders were more interested in flying to Western capitals than they were prepared to rally the masses in the townships and the rural areas – except during the pre-election phases during which conditions were manipulated to cause maximum difficulty for the MDC.
| "The MDC became a “captured” movement – responding more to the demands and concerns of the international community and less to the daily concerns of the local people" |
| SEHLARE MAKGETLANENG |
In the end the MDC was not visible beyond the urban areas. Yet Mugabe plotted and repeatedly dismissed the MDC as an instrument for Western imperialism. … What did the MDC do to avert that impression of being a stooge for the West? Nothing, besides shallow media denials that it was not. Worse, perhaps drawing comfort from the support it received as a pro-democracy movement the MDC publicly displayed its friendship with the Western powers. Unsurprisingly, its folly the leadership ended up eating from the same plate with the “consultant”, the notorious Ari Ben Menashe, who turned out to be Mugabe’s spy.8
Magaisa further maintains that the MDC’s “biggest problem” is that it “seems to have lost focus on the primary reasons for its emergence in 1999 and the key points of challenge against Zanu PF that really matter to the people” of the country. This issue is directly related to its being the movement “captured” by “the international community.” Instead of “focusing on the wider primary reasons for people’s disgruntlement” against the ruling party, it has became “obsessed with the matter of “human rights.” It has reduced Zimbabwe’s problems to “the human rights paradigm” to such an extent that it has “marginalised” the “key challenges against the government” which it discusses “on a “by the way” basis.”9 Its obsession with human rights which led it to base its “Mugabe must go” strategy has led it to “universalise” Zimbabwe’s problems and to find the issue that is “universal and affects everyone” within itself. It has served it in managing contradictory and antagonistic interests and positions it represents. It has also served it in its struggle to win support from developed countries particularly those which have made the promotion of human rights and the regime change the integral part of their foreign policy. This obsession with human rights has “also meant lost opportunities to challenge Mugabe on key areas that directly affect people on the ground – education, health, transport, employment, development, etc. ”10
It is of strategic importance to base the strategy on “issues that resonate in the local context” or to put at the forefront issues which are “uppermost in the mind of the people, and foremost in their hearts.” Unless the MDC refocuses its “energy” on these issues, Magaisa concludes that it will continue to look to the international community – which frankly has more interests elsewhere and will continue to shout against Mugabe, but ultimately do nothing, but all the while, their businesses are still doing business in Zimbabwe.11
Magaisa’s position that the MDC should base its strategy not on issues which “universalise” Zimbabwe’s problems and on the issue which is “universal and affects everyone” within itself, but on issues which advance the interests of the masses of Zimbabwe is a strategic advice to the MDC. It is supportive of the reality that the democratisation struggle in Zimbabwe entails the transformation of the material conditions of the masses of the people in line with the realisation of their strategic and tactical interests. The democratisation struggle is not only about respect for the rule of law, promotion and protection of human rights, accountability, transparency, a free flow of information and separation of powers between executive, legislative and judicial branches of government. The view of democratisation process only or largely in legal and constitutional terms runs the danger of masking socio-political and economic interests in favour of the few within the society. It is in this context that we can fully understand the strategic importance of Amilcar Cabral’s position that we must:
Always bear in mind that the people are not fighting for ideas, for things in anyone’s head. They are fighting to win material benefits, to live better and in peace, to see their lives go forward, to guarantee the future of their children.12
Zvakwana Sokwanele, a civic action support group, responding to why the MDC has not adopted and implemented viable strategies in response to the announcement of the date of holding the 31 March 2005 elections and immediately after announcement of the results of elections pointed out that it has “shown a clear lack of leadership in putting” viable “different strategies” to its “benefactors” and “grassroots supporters” and that its leaders “seem to be as confused as ever.”13
Quoting Pius Wakatama that “as a people’s movement, the MDC should forget the orthodox niceties of professional political conduct with its feigned diplomacy, tactics, gimmicks and meaningless political correctness” and that its “actions should only be shaped in response to the cries of those in bondage,”14 Zvakwana Sokwanele in its 20 April 2005 message to the MDC leadership, maintained that the MDC should have embarked upon a programme of action which includes the use of mass actions, especially strikes against the state, the massive mobilisation of the civil society organisations, especially the churches to defy the ruling party prohibitions, the staging of peaceful protests to greatly embarrass the government at international and national high profile forums, the use of targeted boycotts of goods and services provided by leaders of the ruling party, and the exposure of those who have enormously benefited from Mugabe’s personal patronage, and at expense of the people.15 The MDC has not embarked upon the programme of action which includes these activities.
Zvakwana/Sokwanele maintains that if the MDC leadership demonstrates that it understand the dynamics of the Zimbabwean national situation and is willing to change its tactics in order to effectively challenge and confront the state, it will win the decisive support from the majority of Zimbabweans. If it does not change its tactics or delays too long in changing its tactics, it will risk losing its support substantially within a short period of time. If this happens, “the centre of resistance to the Mugabe regime will undoubtedly shift elsewhere.” Its position that “the party of change must now show itself flexible enough to change its own central strategy” and that if it “fails to do so, and rapidly, we believe it will become irrelevant to the new form of political contest that is taking shape in Zimbabwe” is a strategic advice to the MDC that it “must adapt or die.”16
The MDC has refused to adapt. It has failed to adequately respond to the ruling party’s view of Zimbabwe’s problems. The ruling party views Zimbabwe’s problems from the national level to the regional and continental levels as the Pan-African struggle against imperialist domination and exploitation. It has so far not recognised the fundamental need to have a viable, progressive national, regional, continental and international strategy and tactics. Despite the fact that it is the political party in the former settler colonial country, it has not yet articulated a clear position on race relations, North-South relations, redistribution of resources and the continental and international pan-African agenda. These are some of the key issues which should be addressed clearly by the serious opposition party in its struggle for state political power in a former settler colony such as Zimbabwe.
The International Crisis Group supports this reality in its report on Zimbabwe after the 2005 elections and in its recommendations on what should be done by internal and external interested parties in the resolution of its problems. It recommended that the MDC should develop a clear position on the best, effective way to exert pressure upon the government, revitalise tactical and strategic alliances and working relations with civil society and other social forces, renew its leadership and structures by holding elections, develop viable alternatives programmes on the socio-political and economic issues affecting the people of the country and rebuild external relations, especially with Southern African government and the African Union.17
Critics of the ruling party including some MDC members maintain that Morgan Tsvangirai does not have the intellectual capacity to lead effective opposition party particularly given the fact that it is challenging hegemonic party which has been in power since 1980 and whose intellectuals have been providing it with enormous intellectual capacity and resources in its struggle for continued exercise of state political power. They maintain that he is no match for Robert Mugabe in terms of intellectual capacity and inspiring members and supporters of their respective political parties. The point is that he is not a shrewd leader. He lacks “a degree of political imagination and ruthlessness.”18 Africa Confidential has been consistent in highlighting Tsvangirai’s profound lack of shrewd leadership qualities. In 2000 Tsvangirai made a crucial political mistake when he allowed international media to record white farmers handing over cheques to him. These were the same farmers who were practically against the national liberation struggle. The film made him appear either hungry for money or “naïve.” Mugabe’s advisors used the incident in a propaganda war that presented the MDC is the servant of the white minority and Britain.19 Tsvangirai’s association with these farmers, many of them soldiers of the Rhodesian army which fought against national liberation struggle, isolated him from progressive people nationally and internationally.20 Africa Confidential and Newton Kanhema, Zimbabwean journalist, agree that Tsvangirai profoundly lacks shrewd leadership qualities.
Kanhema maintains the position that Tsvangirai and his advisers do not constitute leadership material for Zimbabwe. Tsvangirai’s position on the land question, which is popular among Africans of the country, is not clear. He has not articulated a clear, feasible plan to solve Zimbabwe’s economic problems. His contribution to the debate on how best to solve Zimbabwe’s economic problems has been his position that the economic situation will get better once Mugabe is no longer in power. Instead of building alliances or working relations with leaders of Southern Africa, he has “elected to insult them and, at the same time, court favour with Western leaders.” His way of dealing with African leaders such as President Thabo Mbeki and President Olusegun Obasanjo. This is not the best way to “win friends and influence people, let alone get support” in the struggle for state political power.21
THE MDC’S INHERITANCE OF THE INCORRECT STRATEGY
The MDC inherited the position that solution to Zimbabwe’s problems lies on the shoulders of leaders of African countries, not on the people of Zimbabwe from developed countries. Developed countries and their supporters regarded the need for political reform as a solution to what they regarded as the problem. President Mugabe was viewed as the problem to this solution. This proposed solution to Zimbabwe’s problems was best and briefly articulated in their “Mugabe must go” demand. They hoped that Tsvangirai would defeat Mugabe in the 2002 presidential elections. Mugabe defeated Tsvangirai in the elections. They regarded elections not as free and fair and the Zimbabwean government as illegitimate. They embarked upon various programmes of action to isolate the Zimbabwean government throughout the world.
They regard Mugabe as authoritarian, corrupt and dictator who has been stealing elections since the MDC posed a challenge to his rule in the 2000 elections. Mugabe is regarded as a threat to the socio-political and economic development and progress not only of his country and the Southern African region, but also of the whole African continent as well as Africa’s initiatives such as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development. Leaders of developed countries have been exerting pressure upon leaders of Southern African countries to join them in condemning Mugabe. They have been demanding that South Africa must play a leading role in acting against Mugabe for what they regard as his violations of human rights in Zimbabwe. Robert Rotberg’s article, “Dictatorship and Decay: Only Mbeki can rescue Zimbabwe”22 is the most advanced representative of the position that the solution to Zimbabwe’s socio-political and economic problems including the issue of removing Mugabe from power is the responsibility of President Mbeki and other African leaders, not the people of Zimbabwe. One of the key issues central to this view is the profound failure to view the Zimbabwean situation beyond Mugabe. This view has helped to marginalise the MDC in its efforts to provide the solution to Zimbabwea’s problems. These are key issues charactering the MDC’s “Mugabe must go” strategy.
Some supporters of the MDC have been misleading it in their position that Zimbabwe’s problems are issues to be solved by leaders of Southern African, not by the people of Zimbabwe. Roger Bate is one of these supporters. He maintains the position that “pressure must be brought to bear” on Zimbabwe’s Southern African Development Community neighbours to “enforce the agreed election protocols or they, and not just Zimbabwe, should face the withdrawal of aid, trade deals, and other United States largesse.”23 He further maintains that:
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice …Must convince SADC leaders that United States aid, military support, and other diplomatic favors such as trade deals hinge on their solving the problem on their doorstep. They must believe that unless they enforce the election protocols agreed by Mugabe [SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections], the United States will withdraw support for the region.24
The fact that the MDC has put this article on its website is supportive of the fact that it agrees with this incorrect position that the solution to Zimbabwe’s problems lies on the shoulders of the leaders of Southern Africa, not on the shoulders of the people of Zimbabwe under its leadership. Another issue is the way it has been criticising leaders of African countries for their alleged support for Mugabe and the ruling party. The way it has been criticising leaders of African countries particularly of Southern Africa is such that it is of the view that it is their responsibility to solve Zimbabwe’s problems, not only to support the people of Zimbabwe in solving their country’s problems. Alex Magaisa, a Zimbabwean lawyer, maintains that the MDC has been “hoping that the solution” to Zimbabwe’s problems “would come from outside” the country “and that in the scheme of things, the people of Zimbabwe were powerless and had no role to play beyond participation in a clearly manipulated electoral process.”25
| "In order to safeguard the interests of their kith and kin in the country, the British and Scandinavian countries rallied behind the formation of the opposition MDC" |
| SEHLARE MAKGETLANENG |
The responsibility to exert pressure upon Mugabe necessary for him to step down as the president of Zimbabwe lies with the people of Zimbabwe, not with the leaders of African countries. This is contrary to the position of the MDC that this responsibility lies with the leaders of African countries. This position is maintained by its supporters internally in Zimbabwe and externally outside Zimbabwe. It is interesting to note that it does not maintain that this responsibility lies also with leaders of developed countries. This reality is supportive of the position that this incorrect position is a means of leaders of developed countries to use African countries particularly South Africa to play a leading role to achieve their objective in Zimbabwe.
This position and attempts by developed countries to use African countries to achieve their objective in Zimbabwe have helped the leadership of the ruling party in its position that the MDC is a tool of imperialist powers to achieve their interests in Zimbabwe. They have supported the ruling party in its position that the MDC is a tool of imperialist powers, particularly Britain in its intention to recolonise Zimbabwe.26 The Herald, the newspaper controlled by the Zimbabwean state, quoting extensively from articles which appeared in the London press and from subsequent speeches by Tony Blair, British Prime Minister, articulated the state’s position as follows:
In order to safeguard the interests of their kith and kin in the country, the British and Scandinavian countries rallied behind the formation of the opposition MDC. Their intention was to install a puppet government willing to bend to their colonial designs and adventures … However, soon … the British started showing their real colours by advocating sanctions against Zimbabwe for alleged human rights abuses. But realising the hideous intentions of the British, countries in the Southern African Development Community ad the African Union supported Zimbabwe by saying that land was at the core of the problems in the countries … It is not surprising to note that Tanzania, Malawi, Namibia, Mozambique, Nigeria and South Africa have all refused to succumb to bullying tactics by Britain because they are all aware of its hidden agenda to topple the present Zimbabwean government … So it is clear that the victory by ZANU-PF in the just ended presidential poll was indeed a victory against imperialism.27
Pointing out that President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and President Bakili Muluzi of Malawi “failed to persuade Mugabe” when they “visited” him on 5 May 2004 in Harare to “say whether, or when, he intends to step down,” Africa Confidential maintains the correct position that the responsibility to exert pressure upon Mugabe necessary for him to step down as the president of Zimbabwe lies with the people of Zimbabwe under their leaders, not with the leaders of African countries when it concluded that this failure “puts the responsibility back where it belongs, with Zimbabwe’s own leaders.”28
The MDC’s incorrect position that the responsibility to exert pressure upon Mugabe necessary for him to step down as the president of Zimbabwe lies with the leaders of African countries, not with the people of Zimbabwe, is defended by its president. After the efforts of President Mbeki and President Obasanjo to promote dialogue between the ruling party and the MDC, Tsvangirai pointed out in August 2002 that their efforts were attempts to “legitimise Mugabe” and enabled Mugabe to consolidate his power and position. In his words:
They came in hoping to bring about dialogue and reconciliation between the parties – that was an attempt to legitimise Mugabe, without confronting the issue of Mugabe’s legitimacy in the March 2002 election. They chose diplomacy rather than democracy and gave Mugabe space to consolidate his position.29
Did the MDC, through its theoretical and practical weaknesses, not help to “legitimise Mugabe” and “give Mugabe space to consolidate his position?”
Weizmann Hamilton maintains that the MDC has enabled or “gave Mugabe’’ and the ruling party political “space to consolidate’’ their “position.’’ The fact that it is supported by “big business and white farmers at home and imperialism and its institutions” has “undermined its support among the masses in Zimbabwe and throughout Southern Africa. Its support by white farmers, “who continue to oppress and exploit farm labourers” has helped to undermine its rural support. It has refrained from mobilising mass action against the government and concentrated on appealing to the external forces to exert pressure upon Mugabe and the ruling party. This programme of action enabled Mugabe to maintain that the survival of his administration is a struggle against external interference in defence of “white minority business and farming interests” and to present the MDC as the organisational agent of imperialism.30
Tsvangirai’s harsh criticism of President Mbeki and President Obasanjo is reflection of his incorrect position that the responsibility to exert pressure upon Mugabe necessary for him to step down as the president of Zimbabwe lies with the leaders of African countries, not with the people of Zimbabwe. In his speech to the MDC Members of Parliament in Harare on 18 December 2002, he maintained that President Mbeki had “embarked on an international safari to campaign for Mugabe’s regime. Pretoria is free to pursue its agenda. But it must realise that Zimbabweans can never be fooled anymore.”31 The relevant question is whether or not Tsvangirai ever realised that “Zimbabweans can never be fooled” by his profound lack of shrewd political qualities, his failure in leading the MDC to provide viable theoretical and practical positions, policies and programme of action which constitute the alternative to the ruling party and his fundamental weaknesses in articulating Zimbabwe’s national socio-political and economic issues and taking strategic and tactical decisions in the interest of the MDC’s struggle for power.
In criticising the efforts of President Mbeki and President Obasanjo to see to it that Zimbabwe is readmitted to the Commonwealth of Nations, he maintained that these efforts represented:
The disreputable end game of a long-term Obasanjo-Mbeki strategy designed to infiltrate and subvert not only the Commonwealth effort but, indeed, all other international efforts intended to rein in Mugabe’s violent and illegitimate regime. Through this diabolical act of fellowship and solidarity with a murderous dictatorship, General Obasanjo and Mr Mbeki have now openly joined Mugabe as he continues to wage a relentless war against the people of Zimbabwe. They are now self-confessed fellow travellers on a road littered with violence, destruction and death.32
The MDC’s incorrect position that the responsibility to exert pressure upon Mugabe necessary for him to step down as the president of Zimbabwe lies with the leaders of African countries, not with the people of Zimbabwe under its leadership is its misunderstanding of the importance of the primacy of internal factors over external factors either in the resolution or the maintenance of internal problems of a given country.
RELATIONS BETWEEN ZIMBABWE AND DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
Zimbabwe as a social formation dominated by developed countries within international capitalism is a formation whose internal primary economic contradiction is dominated, controlled and exploited by developed countries to satisfy the needs, demands and exigencies of their national socio-political and economic relations. The solution to this socio-political and economic problem lies internally within Zimbabwe, not externally outside it. This means that it lies on the shoulders of the people of Zimbabwe, not on the shoulders of those who are not Zimbabweans. The same applies to the maintenance of this problem. The state in Zimbabwe has proved the importance of internal factors over external factors in its adoption and implementation of its economic policies.33
The relationship between Zimbabwe and developed countries particularly Britain is primarily not the external process. It is primarily the internal, national process. Zimbabwe’s current national situation should be approached by taking into consideration primarily dynamics of its specific internal movement which determines it. The international, external situation in which its specific movement takes place is a general, universal condition. It is not a particular condition. Factors within Zimbabwe determine the consequences of the international situation upon its national, internal situation. Discussion and explanation of the relationship between Zimbabwe and developed countries for their concrete understanding should be executed and achieved on the basis of a profound, dialectical, concrete historical and class analysis of Zimbabwe’s specific or particular national situation without losing sight of what is taking place throughout the world particularly within international capitalism.
The content of the relationship which developed countries established and maintain with Zimbabwe is the process which is, internally and externally, condensed materially in its state. Is the post-settler colonial Zimbabwean state, material condensation of the struggle between labour and capital, the material condensation of the process of exploitation of the masses of the people by the forces of exploitation or of the process of liberation of the masses of the people? Is it maintaining exploitation or helping to end it? Is it reconciling contradictions between the forces of capital for the defence of their strategic interests or is it reconciling contradictions among the masses of the people for the achievement of their strategic interests?
The point is that underlying the process of economic transformation are the key questions concerning the exercise of the state political power: which social class or class alliance exercises the state political power in the country, by what tactical means and to what strategic ends? How is the exercise of the state political power, its means and ends, supported and contested by other social forces in the society? The fact that the masses of the Zimbabwean people are experiencing socio-economic problems is primarily the result of the national socio-political and economic policies pursued by the state of Zimbabwe. It is not primarily because of the relationship of Zimbabwe’s economy with the international capitalist economic system. The issue of managing this relationship in Zimbabwe to effectively generate and distribute its benefits among the people of Zimbabwe depends on the state’s practical commitment to the popular demands and interests and the balance of forces among those controlling the state on the satisfaction of the needs, demands and exigencies of Zimbabwe’s national socio-political and economic relations.
The practical implementation of the theoretical understanding of the importance of the primacy of internal factors over external factors is of crucial importance to either resolution or maintenance of relations of socio-political and economic problems in Zimbabwe including inequalities, domination and exploitation, which developed countries established and maintain with Zimbabwe. It is through the process of confronting and resolving internal relations of inequalities, domination and exploitation within Zimbabwe that relations of inequalities, domination and exploitation between Zimbabwe and developed countries will be resolved. Relations of inequalities, domination and exploitation between Zimbabwe and developed countries cannot be resolved without resolving internal relations of inequalities, domination and exploitation within Zimbabwe.
The fundamental resolution of social relations of inequalities, domination and exploitation within Zimbabwe is the prerequisite means for the fundamental resolution of relations of inequalities, domination and exploitation between Zimbabwe and developed countries. Relations of inequalities, domination and exploitation within Zimbabwe facilitate the defence and expansion of relations of inequalities, domination and exploitation between Zimbabwe and developed countries. This is the key central issue essential to the realisation of the qualitative, fundamental socio-political, ideological and economic transformation of Zimbabwe.
Zimbabwe, because of its problems and the way it has decided to solve them, threatens to provide a hope to the masses of the people of Africa to solve relations of domination and exploitation between their countries and developed countries. The way it has decided to solve these relations has helped to send a clear message to the masses of the people of Africa that beggars cannot be choosers and implementers of strategies and tactics to solve these relations.34 These relations between African countries and developed countries are characterised, among others, by:
(a) the dominance in the national economy of foreign ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange; (b) the consequent foreign exploitation of indigenous resources; (c) various forms of socio-cultural and political dependence which sustain[ed] these ownership and exploitative relations; (d) the external orientation of the national economy; (e) the confinement of national participation in the international division of labor to primary production for export and the importation of manufactured goods; (f) confidence in the salutary nature of external conditions; (g) high hope of benefits from foreign relations; and (h) appeals to the humanitarian sentiments of the advanced [capitalist] countries, as the major means of international influence [and national development - S.M.].35
Some of these factors characterising relations between African countries and developed countries no longer characterise Zimbabwe in its relations with developed countries. Zimbabwe is also threatening to resolve the penetrated nature of its political economy. According to James Rosenau:
A penetrated political [economy] system is one in which nonmembers of a national society participate directly and authoritatively, through actions taken jointly with the society’s members, in either the allocation of its values or the mobilization of support on behalf of its goals.36
| "Some supporters of the MDC have been misleading it in their position that Zimbabwe’s problems are issues to be solved by leaders of Southern African, not by the people of Zimbabwe" |
| SEHLARE MAKGETLANENG |
Zimbabwe is challenging the position of Oxfam in its Make Trade Fair Campaign that the “future of Africa, more than that of any other continent, hinges on the collective global action” and that the “ways in which Africa trades, receives aid and debt relief and governs itself is not the responsibility of Africans alone; these issues are the responsibility of decision-makers and global citizens everywhere.”37 This position is supportive of the reality not only that the political economy of Africa is the most open, penetrated, dependent and dominated formation, but also that the African continent and its people are viewed as objects of compassion and contempt by some individuals throughout the world.
This position is also maintained by Britain. The British High Commissioner to South Africa maintains it as follows:
The whole world is demanding that we act, collectively, to bring greater prosperity to Africa. If we fail to take this opportunity, we will betray the future not only of the children of Africa, but the children of the world. We will be condemning generations of Africans to poverty and despair. Now is the time to act, together, in true partnership.38
CONCLUSION
Our work has provided analysis of the theoretical and practical weaknesses of the MDC and its failure to understand and recognise the importance of the primacy of internal factors over the external factors in the resolution of Zimbabwe’s socio-political and economic problems.
The MDC has not addressed itself seriously and effectively to the issue of power relations in Zimbabwe and the fundamental need to change them in favour of the interests of the vast majority of the people of Zimbabwe. It has not seriously, in theory and practice, recognised the importance of organising or mobilising the people to achieve political, economic and ideological hegemony as prerequisite not only for removal of those controlling the state from political power, but also for establishing alternative socio-political and economic order.
It is for these key reasons that it has not seriously and effectively challenged the ruling party in its struggle to “legitimately exercise power and authority over the control and management of the country’s affairs in the interest of the people and in accordance with the principles of justice, equity, accountability and transparency.”39 This has led some individuals and organisations to conclude that the resolution to Zimbabwe’s problems lies within the ruling party, not the MDC. The position that the resolution to Zimbabwe’s problems lies within the ruling party, not the MDC is articulated, among others, by Godfrey Kanyenze’s when he maintains that we should focus on Mugabe and the ruling party, not Tsvangirai and the MDC and that the “greatest threat to ZANU-PF right now is ZANU-PF itself, not the MDC.”40
Zimbabwe is one of African countries which in their post-colonial era have not become free and independent of what they have inherited. This inheritance is the socio-historical result of the relations of domination and exploitation developed countries have established and maintained with them before achievement of their political independence. The history of post-colonial Africa is the history of the consolidation of its domination and exploitation by developed countries. The post-colonial era in African countries is characterised by the emergence and expansion of the national bourgeoisie, which serves largely to maintain relations of domination and exploitation between their countries and developed countries through the defence of capitalism in their countries. The majority of African leaders have not only inherited these relations, but have also been defending them so as to enjoy the benefits and opportunities of international capitalist system.41
This reality is captured by Professor Jonathan Moyo when he maintains that the “assertion that the majority of African governments are now democratic is premised on contentious notions of democracy with external origins,” that apart from this,” this “assertion has no empirical basis,” that “multiparty elections” which “are now common in Africa” do “not describe a fundamental development” and “have not led to new power relations in Africa” and that “Zambia and Malawi since the fall of Kenneth Kaunda and the late Kamuzu Banda” are supportive of this reality, that “Zimbabwe is following suit with reckless abandon,” that the “claim that African governments are now running liberalized market-driven economies” is “an acknowledgement of the power of international financial institutions over local policymaking” and that imperialism “is a pivotal force in international affairs and the frenzy of liberalized market economies makes” the “analysis of imperialism “even more urgent, especially in the light of the proliferation of corrupt regimes bent on hoodwinking their citizens by hiding under the canopy of IMF and World Bank-dictated policies.”42
Central to the fundamental and structural need for the MDC to fundamentally transform itself is the reality that it must strive to have credible policies which are alternatives to those of the ruling party and of international organisations such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. It must also have programmes of action cable of responding to socio-political and economic challenges in Zimbabwe. It should also have a concrete understanding of socio-political and economic developments and debates in other countries particularly Southern African regional and African continental countries and view them progressively within the context of Pan-African agenda of resolving Africa’s problems.
In other words, it should implement understanding that for the political party or a movement to effectively mobilize the people, generate a viable alternative agenda, and develop a capacity to establish a responsible, democratic, and accountable government on coming to power, it must have certain qualities: effective and flexible organization; ability to generate resources for its operations; a viable alternative program for overall reconstruction and rehabilitation; an effective foreign policy; legitimate and visionary leadership; a strong internal and public education program to challenge the established world view; a transparently democratic and accountable structure; and in-depth knowledge of existing political (even theoretical) debates, blueprints, developments in other nations, and of the local political economy.
Such a movement must cultivate and retain the support of alternative constituencies; its politics must be seen to be different from the discredited past; and the leadership must be principled, consistent in its philosophy, and be above board morally. Finally, the leadership and movement must be capable of distinguishing between rhetoric and practical politics, and must consistently strive to stay and operate above primordial and opportunistic considerations.43
* Dr Sehlare Makgetlaneng is the Head of Southern Africa and SADC programme at the Africa Institute of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa
2 Stefan Andreasson, “Economic Reform and ‘Virtual Democracy’ in South Africa and Zimbabwe: The Incompatibility of Liberalisation, Inclusion and Development,” Journal of Contemporary African Studies, Vol. 21, No. 3 (September 2003), pp. 393-7, Suzanne Dansereau, “Liberation and Opposition in Zimbabwe,” Journal of Contemporary African Studies, Vol. 21, No. 2 (May 2003), pp. 181-5, and Lloyd Sachikonye, “The Year of Zimbabwe’s political watershed,” Southern Africa Political & Economic Monthly, Vol. 14, No. 3 (December-January 2000-2001), p. 7.
3 Munyaradzi Gwisai, interviewed in Alternative Information and Development Centre, “Zimbabwe after the 2005 Parliamentary Elections,” Alternatives, Vol. 3, No. 14 (April-May 2005), p. 8.
4 Suzanne Dansereau, ‘’Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Zimbabwe’s Development Impasse,’’ in Henning Melber (editor), Zimbabwe – The Political Economy of Decline (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2005), p. 23.
5 Ibid., p. 24.
6 Barney Mthombothi, “Why Mugabe still wields power?” The Star (Johannesburg), 3 November 2004, p. 14.
7 Ibid.
8 Alex T. Magaisa, “The pitfalls of opposition politics in Zimbabwe,” newzimbabwe.com, 8 August 2005 (http://newzimbabwe.com/pages/thirdforce11.12923.html), pp. 1-2.
9 Ibid., p. 2.
10 Ibid., pp. 2-3.
11 Ibid., p. 3.
12 Amilcar Cabral, Revolution in Guinea: Selected Texts by Amilcar Cabral (New York: and London: Monthly Review Press, 1969), p. 86.
13 Sokwanele: Civic Action Support Group, “A Message to the MDC Leadership,”(http://www.sokwanele.com/articles/sokwanele/amessagetomdcleadership-20april2005), p. 1.
14 Pius Wakatama, quoted in Sokwanele: Civic Action Support Group, “A Message to the MDC Leadership,” (http://www.sokwanele.com/articles/sokwanele/amessagetomdcleadership-20april2005), p. 2.
15 Sokwanele: Civic Action Support Group, “A Message to the MDC Leadership,”(http://www.sokwanele.com/articles/sokwanele/amessagetomdcleadership-20april2005), p. 2.
16 Ibid.
17 International Crisis Group, Post-Election Zimbabwe: What Next? Africa Report No. 93 (7 June 2005), p. 3. This report is available on the International Crisis Group website: http://www.crisisgroup.org.
18 Africa Confidential, ‘’Zimbabwe: The road to ruin,’’ Vol. 42, No. 20, 12 October 2001, p. 4.
19 Africa Confidential, ‘’Zimbabwe: Who is next?’’ Vol. 44, No. 10, 16 May 2003, pp. 4-5.
20 Newton Kanhema, ‘’Who is going to succeed Mugabe?’’ Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 11 May 2003, p. 5.
21 Newton Kanhema, ‘’Who is going to succeed Mugabe?’’ Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 11 May 2003, p. 5.
22 Robert Rotberg, ‘’Dictatorship and Decay: Only Mbeki can rescue Zimbabwe,’’ Business Day (Johannesburg), 8 December 2004, p. 9.
23 Roger Bate, ‘’Zimbabwe’s Impending Elections – What Other Countries Can Do, and Why,’’ Movement for Democratic Change Online, 2 March 2005 (http://www.mdczimbabwe.org/Archives/2005/march/zimimpendingelec.htm, p.1.
24 Ibid., p. 6.
25 Alex T. Magaisa, “The pitfalls of opposition politics in Zimbabwe,” newzimbabwe.com, 8 August 2005 (http://newzimbabwe.com/pages/thirdforce11.12923.html), p. 2.
26 Ian Phimister and Brian Raftopoulous, ‘’Mugabe, Mbeki and the Politics of Anti-Imperialism,’’ Review of African Political Economy, No. 101, 2004, pp. 385-400.
27 The Herald, quoted in Ian Phimister and Brian Raftopoulous, ‘’Mugabe, Mbeki and the Politics of Anti-Imperialism,’’ Review of African Political Economy, No. 101, 2004, p. 387.
28 Africa Confidential, ‘’Zimbabwe: Who is next?’’ Vol. 44, No. 10, 16 May 2003, p. 3.
29 Morgan Tsvangirai, quoted in Africa Confidential, ‘’Zimbabwe: Who is next?’’ Vol. 44, No. 10, 16 May 2003, p. 3.
30 Weizmann Hamilton, ‘’Cling to Power in Zimbabwe,’’ Socialism Today: the monthly journal of the Socialist Party, Issue 63, March 2002, p. 2.
31 Morgan Tsvangirai, quoted in Patrick Bond, ‘’Can NEPAD Survive its Proponents, Sponsors, Clients and Peers?’’ OSSREA Newsletter, Vol. XX1, No. 3, October 2003, p. 14.
32 Ibid.
33 Hevina S. Dashwood, ‘’The Relevance of Class to the Evolution of Zimbabwe’s Development Strategy,’’ Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1, March 1996, pp. 127-48.
34 Cheryl Hendricks and Elias Mandala, ‘’Beggars Can’t be Choosers: Reflections on the Zimbabwe Quagmire,’’ CODESRIA Bulletin, Nos. 1 and 2, 2002, pp. 9-11.
35 Okwudiba Nnoli, Self Reliance and Foreign Policy in Tanzania: The Dynamics of the Diplomacy of a New State, 1961 to 1971 (Lagos: NOK Publishers, 1978), p. 7.
36 James Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press, 1971), pp. 127-8.
37 Oxfam, ‘’Fair Trade,’’ African Decisions, July-September 2002, p. 22.
38 Paul Boateng, ‘’Gleneagles Agenda: Britain wants whole
hog for Africa,’’ Business Day (Johannesburg), 28 June 2005,
p. 11.
39 Sam Moyo, ‘’Policy Dialogue, Improved Governance, and the New Partnerships: Experiences from Southern Africa,’’ in Hennock Kifle, Adebayo Olukoshi and Lennart Wohlgemuth (editors), A New Partnership for African Development: Issues and Parameters (Stockholm: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1997), p. 61.
40 Godfrey Kanyenze, quoted in Charles Rukuni, ‘’Tsvangirai still all the MDC has got,’’ Financial Gazette (Harare), 31 May 2005, p. 2, and Godfrey Kanyenze, quoted in Charles Rukuni, ‘’Tsvangirai still all the MDC has got,’’ The Insider (Harare), 31 May 2005, p. 2.
41 Sehlare Makgetlaneng, ‘’Challenges and Solution in the Struggle for Independent African Foreign Policies,’’ in Louis Serapiao, Sehlare Makgetlaneng, V.S. Sheth, Francis Makoa, Moses Ralinala, Christopher Saunders and Wilfred Ndongko, African Foreign Policies in the 21st Century (Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2001), p. 14.
42 Jonathan N. Moyo, ‘’African Renaissance: A Critical Assessment,’’ Southern Africa Political & Economic Monthly, Vol. 11, No. 7 (May 1998), p. 11.
43 Julius O. Ihonvbere, ‘’On the Threshold of Another False Start? A Critical Evaluation of Pro-Democracy Movements in Africa,’’ in E. Ike Udogo (editor), Democracy and Democratization in Africa: Toward the 21st Century (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1997), p. 127.
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